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Internal protection/relocation/ﬂight alternative as
an aspect of refugee status determination
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Introduction

In many jurisdictions around the world,1 the possibility of an ‘internal ﬂight alternative’ (IFA) (often referred to as ‘internal relocation alternative’)
∗

M. Kagan JD (Michigan, 2000) prepared a careful synthesis of background materials upon which
this study draws heavily. I am indebted to the insights on this issue provided by participants in
the First University of Michigan Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law in April
1999 in which the understanding of an ‘internal protection alternative’ relied upon here was reﬁned; and to the contributors to the expert roundtable convened at San Remo, Italy, in Sept. 2001
to discuss this paper. This paper generally takes account of legal developments up to 1 Jan. 2002.
1 Such a test has no relevance in State Parties to the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention
Governing the Speciﬁc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, entered into force
20 June 1974. Under Art. I(2) of this regional arrangement, the deﬁnition of a refugee includes
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
Emphasis added.
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is invoked to deny refugee status to persons at risk of being persecuted for a
Convention2 reason in part, but not all, of their country of origin.3 In this, as in
so many areas of refugee law and policy, the viability of a universal commitment to
protection is challenged by divergence in State practice. The goals of this paper are
therefore, ﬁrst, brieﬂy to review the origins and development of the practice of considering IFA as an aspect of the refugee status determination process; secondly, to
identify key protection concerns in leading formulations of the IFA rule; and,
thirdly, to propose relevant substantive and procedural standards which recognize
the legal plausibility in some circumstances of considering internal protection alternatives, but which we believe avoid most of the protection pitfalls of current
practice and doctrine.
For the sake of clarity, we refer to the ‘best standard’ approach proposed in this
paper as the ‘internal protection alternative’ (IPA), a form of words which more precisely captures the essence of the permissible range of State discretion. In short, we
believe that refugee status may not lawfully be denied simply because the asylum
seeker ought ﬁrst to have attempted to ﬂee within his or her own State, nor even on
the grounds that it would presently be possible for the applicant to secure ‘safety’
in the home country by relocating internally. Where an asylum seeker is shown to
have access to true internal protection inside his or her own country, however, refugee
status need not be recognized. This is because international refugee law is designed
only to provide a back-up source of protection to seriously at-risk persons. Its purpose is not to displace the primary rule that individuals should look to their State of
nationality for protection, but simply to provide a safety net in the event a State fails
2 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (hereinafter ‘1951 Convention’).
3 This was the conclusion of the authors of a review of State practice in eighteen jurisdictions: see
European Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA), ‘The Application of the Concept of Internal Protection Alternative’ (research paper, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), London,
1998, updated 2000) (hereinafter ‘ELENA Research Paper’), p. 65: ‘Today, however, there is no
doubt that the concept is ﬁrmly established in the national jurisprudence of State parties to
the 1951 Refugee Convention.’ For example, the 1996 European Union’s Joint Position interpreting the refugee deﬁnition includes reference to the internal protection alternative: see ‘Joint
Position Deﬁned by the Council of the European Union on the Basis of Article K.3 of the European
Union Treaty on the Harmonized Application of the Deﬁnition of the Term “Refugee” in
Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 4 March 1996,
OJ 1996 L63/2 (hereinafter ‘EU Joint Position’). Reference to the concept has also been recently
codiﬁed in US asylum law via amended regulations: see Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
Title 8, Immigration and Nationality Regulations, s. 208.13 (hereinafter ‘US Regulations’), which
provide that the presumption of entitlement to refugee status that ﬂows from a showing of past
persecution does not extend to those applicants who ‘could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so’ (s. 208.13(1)(i)(B)). Further, the
regulations provide that an applicant ‘does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the
applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality . . . if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so’.
(s. 208.13 (2)(C)(ii)).
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to meet its basic protective responsibilities.4 As observed by the Supreme Court of
Canada:
The international community was meant to be a forum of second resort for
the persecuted, a ‘surrogate’, approachable upon failure of local protection.
The rationale upon which international refugee law rests is not simply the
need to give shelter to those persecuted by the state, but, more widely, to
provide refuge to those whose home state cannot or does not afford them
protection from persecution.5

It follows logically that persons who face even egregious risks, but who can
secure meaningful protection from their own government, are not eligible for
1951 Convention refugee status. Thus, courts in most countries have sensibly required asylum seekers to exhaust reasonable domestic protection possibilities as
a prerequisite for the recognition of refugee status. Where, for example, the risk of
being persecuted stems from actions of a deviant local authority or non-State entity
(such as a paramilitary group, or vigilante gang) that can and will be effectively suppressed by the national government, there is no need for surrogate international
protection.
The common scepticism of advocates about – and frequently outright rejection
of 6 – the routine canvassing of internal protection alternatives is primarily a function of two factors. First, even though refugee law is generally understood as surrogate protection, State practice traditionally assumed that proof of a sufﬁciently
serious risk in one part of the home country was all that was required. An individual ordinarily qualiﬁed for refugee status if there was a ‘well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’7 in the applicant’s city or region of origin. Until the
mid-1980s, there was no practice of routinely denying asylum on the grounds that
protection against an acknowledged risk could be secured in another part of the
applicant’s State of origin.
To some extent, the traditional failure to explore the possibility of internal protection simply reﬂected the predisposition of Western asylum States to respond
generously (for political and ideological reasons) to the then-dominant stream
of refugees from communism arriving at their borders. With the arrival during
4 J. C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) (hereinafter ‘Hathaway,
Refugee Status’), quotes at pp. 127–8, the French Conseil d’Etat in a decision of May 1983: ‘[T]he
existence and the authority of the State are conceived and justiﬁed on the grounds that it is the
means by which members of the national community are protected from aggression, whether at
the hands of fellow citizens, or from forces external to the State’ (unofﬁcial translation).
5 Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 716.
6 See e.g., B. Frelick, ‘Down the Rabbit Hole: The Strange Logic of Internal Flight Alternative’,
in World Refugee Survey (US Committee for Refugees, Washington DC, 1999), p. 22 (hereinafter
‘Frelick’).
7 1951 Convention, Art. 1A(2).
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the 1980s of increasing numbers of refugees from countries that were politically,
racially, and culturally ‘different’ from Western asylum countries, the historical
openness of the developed world to refugee ﬂows was replaced by a new commitment to exploit legal and other means to avoid the legal duty to admit refugees.8
The IFA inquiry emerged from this context and has played a major role in justifying negative assessments of refugee status.
In addition to concerns about its inauspicious origins, the propriety of considering internal alternatives to asylum has been called into question by the lack
of clarity about why such considerations are an inherent part of the status determination process. Neither the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) nor most States have been consistent and clear in elaborating the legal
basis for undertaking such an assessment. As the analysis in Sections II and III of
this paper demonstrates, the apparently simple formulation of the IFA principle
masks a huge range of variation between and even within States. The doctrinal confusion produces widely inconsistent results for refugee applicants and constitutes
a source of unpredictability in refugee decision making.
These legitimate concerns notwithstanding, it must be conceded that the move
to embrace IFA rules in recent years may also be explained by the growing number
of persons seeking asylum since the late 1980s who are ﬂeeing largely regionalized
threats (including many internal armed conﬂicts) rather than monolithic aggressor
States. The changing nature of the circumstances precipitating ﬂight may have allowed the consideration of the possibility of securing protection within one’s own
State in a way not previously available when the aggressor was usually a central government. If international refugee law is surrogate protection, and if national protection can (given the regionalized nature of many refugee-producing phenomena)
be delivered in some, but not all, parts of the State of origin, then it follows logically
that refugee law should be applied in a way that recognizes the extant realities and
possibilities for individuals and groups to beneﬁt from the protection of their own
country, but which does not compromise access to asylum for those not in a position
to avail themselves of national protection.
Deﬁning this balance was the task set for the University of Michigan’s ﬁrst Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law held in April 1999. Drawing on a framework prepared by the lead co-author of this paper in conjunction
with the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), a group of nine senior
Michigan law students undertook a comprehensive review of the relevant jurisprudence of leading asylum countries. They synthesized their collective research by
substantive sub-topics, and framed a series of critical legal and policy concerns.
These were shared with a distinguished group of leading refugee law academics
8 See J. C. Hathaway, ‘The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée’, 91 Refugees, 1992, pp. 40–l; also published as ‘L’émergence d’une politique de non-entrée’, in Frontières du droit, Frontières des droits
(ed. F. Julien-Laferrière, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1993), pp. 65–7.
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from around the world, each of whom contributed a brief response paper. The
students and academics then worked collaboratively for three days in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, on 9–11 April 1999, to reﬁne an analytical framework for adjudicating
internal protection concerns in consonance with general duties under the 1951
Convention. The result of that effort is the ‘Michigan Guidelines on the Internal
Protection Alternative’.9 The Guidelines have been shared with policymakers, decision makers, and advocates around the world, including with all members of
the International Association of Refugee Law Judges. The ﬁrst formal adoption of
the Guidelines was by the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, in its
Decision No. 71684/99 of 29 October 1999.10 The recommendations of this paper
(detailed in Sections IV–VI) draw heavily on the Guidelines, though with some differences of emphasis.
In sum, whatever the precise reasons for its development and proliferation in the
jurisprudence of many States, the aim of this paper is neither to engage in debates
as to IFA’s suspect origins, nor to argue for its rejection on this basis. Rather, this
study undertakes a consideration of the legal basis for the asserted right to deny
refugee status on internal protection grounds and seeks to articulate the legitimate
scope of rules to govern its application in practice.

II.

Conceptual evolution of the IFA inquiry

The precise origins of the IFA test are not clear. However, the source most
often referred to as encapsulating the classic formulation of the principle is paragraph 91 of the UNHCR Handbook, which provides:
The fear of being persecuted need not always extend to the whole territory of
the refugee’s country of nationality. Thus in ethnic clashes or in cases of grave
disturbances involving civil war conditions, persecution of a speciﬁc ethnic or
national group may occur in only one part of the country. In such situations,
a person will not be excluded from refugee status merely because he could
have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the
circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so.11

While there is little doubt that UNHCR hoped that paragraph 91 would deter
States from excluding persons from refugee status ‘merely’ because they could have
sought internal refuge, three salient features of this formulation have, in practice,
9 See J. C. Hathaway, ‘The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative’, 21(1)
Michigan Journal of International Law, 1999, p. 131 and available on http://www.refugeecaselaw.
org/Refugee/guidelines.htm (hereinafter ‘Michigan Guidelines’).
10 [2000] INLR 165; this decision is also reported at www.refugee.org.nz/index.htm.
11 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1979, re-edited 1992) (hereinafter
‘Handbook’), at para. 91 (emphasis in original).
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frequently led to unwarranted denials of protection. First, the phrasing of paragraph 91 implies that exclusion from refugee status may be justiﬁed if the applicant failed to seek refuge in a part of the country of nationality, thus introducing a
legitimate basis for the application of such a test. Secondly, it engages language that
suggests a retrospective analysis, that is, an inquiry into whether the refugee ‘could
have sought refuge in another part of the same country’ (emphasis added). Rather
than focusing on the predicament that the applicant faces at the time of assessment,
the Handbook’s formulation appears to require an evaluation of the appropriateness
of the applicant’s pre-ﬂight behaviour, a notion embodied in the shorthand phrase
‘internal ﬂight’. Thirdly, it introduces the concept of ‘reasonableness’ into the assessment, a phrase not derived from the 1951 Convention itself, nor elaborated
upon in the Handbook. This formulation has a punitive connotation: if the failure
to seek internal refuge is not adjudged to have been ‘reasonable’, then the person
should be excluded from protection. This is of course difﬁcult to reconcile with
the explicit and closely circumscribed exclusion provisions contained in the 1951
Convention.
Although the Handbook was issued in 1979, the notion of IFA remained largely
dormant until the mid-1980s when northern States began to explore legal options
for restricting the application and scope of the 1951 Convention. IFA jurisprudence
can be said to have begun in 1983–4 when the German Higher Administrative
Court, in an approach endorsed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1989, established a two-stage test that closely mirrored the framework set out in paragraph
91.12 Importantly, however, the Court did not adopt the retrospective quality of the
Handbook’s framework, but provided instead that an applicant could be denied protection if able to ﬁnd safety in an alternative region in his or her home country, providing that the proposed region is free from other dangers or disadvantages that
would be tantamount to persecution. The gist of this approach was soon embraced
by leading common law jurisdictions,13 although the second element of the test
was altered to incorporate the ‘reasonableness’ language of the UNHCR Handbook.
As appellate courts began routinely to endorse the legitimacy of the IFA rule and
12 Judgment of 10 Nov. 1989, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 403/84, 2 BvR 1501/84,
Entscheidungssammlung zum Ausländer- und Asylrecht (EZAR) 203 No. 5.
13 In two early cases, courts in the UK and the US adopted the IFA doctrine, although they did not
engage in substantive analysis of its parameters. In R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT), ex parte
Jonah, [1985] Imm AR 7, the English High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) (QBD) suggested that a trade unionist from Ghana who faced persecution in his previous home might be
denied refugee status if he could live safely in a distant village. The Court ultimately granted
asylum because relocation would have forced him to be separated from his wife (an early application of the reasonableness test). In Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Decisions 211, the US Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 1985 rejected an appeal by a Salvadorean man partly on the basis that ‘the facts do not show that this threat existed in other cities in El Salvador. It may be
that the respondent could have avoided persecution by moving to another city in that country’
(at 235–6).
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to articulate its components,14 the incidence of reliance on IFA considerations increased signiﬁcantly throughout the 1990s.
The Handbook’s formulation did not explicitly set out the textual basis for IFA
analysis. However, further guidance as to the appropriate application of IFA analysis was provided by the UNHCR in March 1995 in an ‘Information Note on Article 1
of the 1951 Convention’, wherein it observed that the ‘underlying assumption’ for
the application of the doctrine is ‘a regionalized failure of the State to protect its
citizens from persecution’. It explained:
Under such circumstances, it is assured that the State authorities are willing
to protect a person against persecution by non-State agents, but they have
been prevented, or otherwise are unable to assure, such protection in certain
areas of the country.15

An important feature of the 1995 UNHCR formulation is that, despite continuing to use the language of ‘internal ﬂight alternative’ and continuing to suggest at
least a partly retrospective analysis,16 the UNHCR acknowledged that the proper
focus of the inquiry is on the ability and/or willingness of the State of nationality to
provide protection. Emphasis was placed on the need for an ‘effective internal ﬂight
alternative’,17 which would exist only where the proposed region is ‘accessible in
safety and durable in character’ and where the conditions in the region correspond
to major human rights instruments.
This protection-focused approach was even more clearly highlighted in an
overview published later in the same year by the UNHCR Regional Bureau for

14 In 1990, the US Court of Appeals (Third Circuit) held that a refugee applicant’s prima facie case
for asylum must include an allegation that ‘he would be persecuted beyond the local vicinity of
his hometown’: Etugh v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 921 F 2d 36 at 39. In 1991, the
English High Court (QBD) quoted para. 91 verbatim, and relied upon it to reject an asylum application: R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gunes, [1991] Imm AR 278. Also in
1991, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal endorsed a para. 91-style, two-pronged test, namely,
that the decision maker must be satisﬁed that ‘there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country in which it ﬁnds an IFA exists’ and that the conditions
in the IFA must be such ‘that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there’: Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FCJ 706 at 710. In 1994, the Full Court of the Federal
Court of Australia handed down an inﬂuential decision in Randhawa v. Minister for Immigration
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, (1994) 124 ALR 265, 19 May 1994, in which it rejected a claim
by a Punjabi Sikh who feared Hindu militants would kill him for belonging to the Akali Party
on internal ﬂight grounds.
15 UNHCR, ‘Information Note on Article 1 of the 1951 Convention’, March 1995 (hereinafter
‘UNHCR 1995 Information Note’), at section 6.
16 Ibid., section 6 states: ‘The possibility to ﬁnd safety in other parts of the country must have existed at the time of ﬂight and continue to be available when the eligibility decision is taken and
the return to the country of origin is implemented.’
17 Ibid.
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Europe.18 This document emphasized that ‘[p]rotection must actually be available
for the person in question in the alternative location’ and that the ‘[p]rotection
must be meaningful’.19 While continuing to endorse the Handbook’s notion of
‘reasonableness’ as part of a protection-based IFA standard, UNHCR for the ﬁrst
time provided some concrete guidance on the essential elements of a ‘reasonableness’ assessment.20 The reasonableness test was said to include factors such as the
provision of basic civil, political, and socio-economic human rights, the subjective circumstances of the applicant, and even the ‘depth and quality of the fear
itself’.21
UNHCR’s most recent analysis of the IFA concept is set out in a 1999 Position
Paper entitled ‘Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alternative to Seeking
Asylum’. This document impliedly reverses the conceptual thinking of the 1995
papers (in which IFA was conceived as relevant to the question of the willingness
and capacity of the State of nationality to provide protection). Instead, IFA was said
to be relevant to whether or not an applicant’s fear is well-founded:
The judgement to be made in cases where relocation is an issue is whether the
risk of persecution that an individual experiences in one part of the country
can be successfully avoided by living in another part of the country. If it can,
and if such a relocation is both possible and reasonable for that individual,
this has a direct bearing on decisions related to the well-foundedness of the fear. In the
event that there is a part of the country where it is both safe and reasonable
for the asylum-seeker to live, the ‘well-founded fear’ criterion may not be fulﬁlled.
The analysis about possible internal relocation can be a legitimate part of the
holistic analysis of whether the asylum-seeker’s fear of persecution is in fact
well-founded.22

In addition to introducing the important conceptual shift from an analysis based
on protection to one based on well-founded fear, it is evident from the above passage that the 1999 Position Paper also engaged the language of ‘relocation’, reﬂecting some State practice that had attempted to move away from a focus on ‘ﬂight’
to a prospective analysis of relocation alternatives.23 The 1999 Position Paper suggested that two key points should be addressed: ﬁrst, whether the alternative site is
a safe location (an analysis of whether the proposed site is free of the relevant risk
18 UNHCR, Regional Bureau for Europe, An Overview of Protection Issues in Western Europe: Legislative Trends and Positions Taken by UNHCR, European Series, vol. 1, No. 3 (Sept. 1995) (hereinafter
‘UNHCR 1995 Overview’).
19 Ibid., p. 32.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 UNHCR, ‘Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alternative to Seeking Asylum – The So-Called
“Internal Flight Alternative” or “Relocation Principle”’, 1999 (hereinafter ‘UNHCR 1999 Position Paper’), at para. 9 (emphasis added).
23 This approach has been particularly favoured in New Zealand case law, although more recently
the approach of the Michigan Guidelines (see above n. 9) has been explicitly adopted. For a
survey of the approach of the New Zealand authorities, see Decision No. 71684/99, New Zealand
Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA), above n. 10.
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and is generally habitable, stable, and accessible); and, secondly, whether it would
be reasonable for this asylum seeker to seek safety in that location (which would include reference to a non-exhaustive list of factors set out in the Position Paper such
as age, sex, health, family situation and relationships, language abilities, and social or other vulnerabilities). As will be explained below, basing an inquiry on these
two notions is problematic.24 While UNHCR’s important shift in understanding
the correct ‘textual home’ for IFA analysis was supported by some State practice, it
is nonetheless vital that we consider as a preliminary matter whether viewing the
IFA inquiry as directed to the existence of a well-founded fear is justiﬁed as a matter
of international law.

III.

The conceptual basis for analysis of internal alternatives
to asylum

The leading cases concerning the IFA principle have generally noted that
the refugee deﬁnition in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention includes two key
clauses: the well-founded fear clause (‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion’) and the protection clause (‘is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country’). While courts have frequently recognized that
the clearest textual home for IFA is in the protection clause,25 the elements of the
two clauses are sometimes conﬂated, with the result that IFA is said to be relevant to
both prongs. For example, in Randhawa v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government
and Ethnic Affairs, Black CJ explained:
Although it is true that the Convention deﬁnition of refugee does not refer to
parts or regions of a country, that provides no warrant for construing the
deﬁnition so that it would give refugee status to those who, although having
a well-founded fear of persecution in their home region, could nevertheless
avail themselves of the real protection of their country of nationality
elsewhere within that country. The focus of the Convention deﬁnition is not
upon the protection that the country of nationality might be able to provide
in some particular region, but upon a more general notion of protection by
that country. If it were otherwise, the anomalous situation would exist that
the international community would be under an obligation to provide
protection outside the borders of the country of nationality even though real
protection could be found within those borders . . . In the present case the
24 See text below at nn. 85–111.
25 See e.g. Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal, [1994] 1 FC 589; Re S., Decision No. 11/91, New Zealand RSAA, 5 Sept. 1991;
and Randhawa, above n. 14.
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delegate correctly asked whether the appellant’s fear was well-founded in
relation to the country of nationality, not simply the region in which he
lived.26

Clearly, the elements of ‘well-founded fear’ and ‘protection’ are to some extent
intertwined. Indeed, in assessing whether a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in any region in the country, the decision maker, in addition to identifying the serious harm that may be inﬂicted for a Convention reason, must also
scrutinize the State’s ability and willingness effectively to respond to the risk.27 As
succinctly framed by the House of Lords in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte
Shah and Islam, ‘Persecution = Serious Harm + The Failure of State Protection’.28
If the State can effectively suppress the risk of serious harm in the claimant’s place
of origin, then the person does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
It is crucial to understand, however, that the analysis shifts signiﬁcantly once it
has already been established that a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his or her home area (region ‘A’), which of course implies that the State is
unable or unwilling to protect the person in that region.29 Once this is established,
26 Randhawa, above n. 14, pp. 268–9.
27 Hathaway, Refugee Status, above n. 4, p. 125. This formulation has been adopted in e.g. R. v. IAT
and Another, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UK House of Lords, [1999]
2 AC 629; Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, House of Lords, [2000] 3 All ER 577;
and Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, above n. 5. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
v. Khawar and Others, [2002] HCA 14, McHugh and Gummow JJ of the High Court of Australia
took the view that the absence of domestic protection is not relevant to the meaning of ‘persecution’: paras. 66–72. However the other two judges comprising the majority disagreed. Kirby J
explicitly afﬁrmed the general common law view that failure of State protection is an essential
element of ‘being persecuted’: paras. 106–18. Gleeson CJ also accepted that ‘failure of the state
to intervene to protect the victim [of persecution] may be relevant to whether the victim’s fear of
continuing persecution is well-founded’ (para. 29), and also appeared to accept the ‘bifurcated’
approach to persecution in stating that ‘[w]here persecution consists of two elements, the criminal conduct of private citizens, and the toleration or condonation of such conduct by the state
or agents of the state, resulting in the withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect, then the requirement that the persecution be for reason of one of the Convention grounds may be satisﬁed by the motivation of either the criminals or the state’ (para. 31).
Callinan J (in dissent) did not address the issue.
28 R. v. IAT and Another, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n. 27, per
Lord Hoffmann. Lord Hoffmann explained, at p. 653, that the relevant persecution comprised
two elements:
First, there is the threat of violence to Mrs Islam by her husband and his political
friends and to Mrs Shah by her husband. This is a personal affair, directed against them
as individuals. Secondly, there is the inability or unwillingness of the State to do
anything to protect them . . . These two elements have to be combined to constitute
persecution within the meaning of the Convention.
29 H. Storey has recently questioned the logic of what he refers to as the ‘home test’, that being the
assumption that a refugee claim should in the ﬁrst instance be assessed in relation to the applicant’s place of origin. His essential point is that this approach unjustiﬁably imports a domicile test into refugee law, treating as legally irrelevant risks which might accrue in other parts
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it is neither logical nor realistic to ﬁnd that the fact that the State can protect the
person in some other region of the country (region ‘B’) means that she no longer
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in region A.30 The well-founded fear
of being persecuted in region A has not been negated or removed by the provision
of national protection in region B, just as the risk would not be removed or negated
by the availability of protection in a country of second nationality or in an asylum
State. In all of these cases, the refugee continues to face a well-founded fear of being
persecuted in region A of his or her country of origin, but is able to avail him or herself of countervailing national protection. To hold otherwise is to construct a legal
ﬁction fundamentally at odds with common sense.
Indeed, the text of the 1951 Convention itself envisages that the possibility of
national protection will not necessarily allay the well-founded fear, as was well
explained by Sedley LJ in the seminal Karanakaran decision:
[B]oth the special adjudicator and the tribunal failed to approach the
Convention methodically. They treated the availability of internal
[protection] as a reason for holding that the fear of persecution was not
well-founded. There may possibly be countries where a fear of persecution,
albeit genuine, can so readily be allayed in a particular case by moving to
another part of the country that it can be said that the fear is either
non-existent or not well-founded, or that it is not ‘owing to’ the fear that the
applicant is here. But a clear limit is placed on this means of negating an
asylum claim by the subsequent provision of the Article that the
asylum-seeker must be, if not unable, then unwilling because of ‘such fear’ –
ex hypothesi his well-founded fear of persecution – to avail himself of his home
of the applicant’s country of origin. ‘Risk of this kind may be more or less real or more or less
remote, but never purely academic’: H. Storey, ‘The Internal Flight/Protection Alternative – Key
Issues’, July 2001, at p. 15 (on ﬁle with authors). On balance, however, there seems little reason to depart from the accepted practice of focusing the inquiry on circumstances in the asylum
seeker’s home area. As an evidentiary matter, an applicant who believes that risks in another region may have an impact on the home region is in no sense foreclosed from adducing evidence
to that effect. Since refugee status is forward-looking and requires only demonstration of a ‘real
chance’ or ‘serious possibility’ of being persecuted, the fact that the harm has not already accrued in the home region is in no sense dispositive of the claim. On the other hand, if there is
no such evidence, it is difﬁcult to see why refugee status needs to be recognized. There is also a
slippery slope argument to be made: any move away from an initial focus on the circumstances
in the region most familiar to the applicant is likely to make it difﬁcult for him or her to discharge the shared duty of fact-ﬁnding (see Handbook, above n. 11, at para. 196) and suggests the
logic of a requirement to demonstrate a country-wide risk of being persecuted (see text below at
nn. 32–9).
30 According to G. de Moffarts, ‘Refugee Status and the Internal Flight or Protection Alternative’
(remarks delivered to the meeting of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, ‘The
1951 Convention at Fifty: The Way Forward’, Pretoria, South Africa, 12–15 July 2001) (hereinafter ‘de Moffarts’): ‘The Internal Flight Alternative is a consequence of the surrogate nature of
international protection. The Convention deﬁnition itself limits refugee status to a person who
can demonstrate inability or legitimate unwillingness to “avail himself of the protection of (the
home) state”.’
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state’s protection. If the simple availability of protection in some part of the
home state destroyed the foundation of the fear or its causative effect, this
provision would never be reached.31

Lest it be thought that this is merely a semantic debate, it is important to elucidate the negative practical consequences of anchoring IFA analysis in the wellfounded fear language of the 1951 Convention.
First, it has led some States and courts to assert a requirement that the applicant
establish ‘country-wide persecution’.32 If an applicant’s fear is said not to be well
founded if it is objectively reasonable for him or her to relocate to a part of his or
her own country, it is not illogical to insist that the applicant establish not only a
well-founded fear in his or her own locality, but also that this fear extends to every
other city, town, and village in the country of origin. For example, in In Re C.A.L., the
US Board of Immigration Appeals rejected a Guatemalan man’s claim for refugee
status on the basis, inter alia, that:
[H]e has not provided any convincing evidence to suggest that his fear of
persecution would exist throughout Guatemala. This Board has found that
an alien seeking to meet the deﬁnition of a refugee must do more than show
a well-founded fear of persecution in a particular place within a country. He
must show that the threat of persecution exists for him country-wide. (emphasis
added)33
31 Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, English Court of Appeal, [2000] 3 All ER
449 at 473–4.
32 This approach has led to criticism from UNHCR: ‘An ongoing practice was the restrictive interpretation in some countries of various elements of the refugee deﬁnition . . . coupled with
the requirement that applicants for refugee status satisfy an excessively stringent burden and
standard of proof. For example, a handful of countries rejected asylum-seekers on the grounds
that, although they demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution, they could not prove that
said fear extended to the whole of the territory of their country of origin’: UN Doc. E/1991/85,
30 May 1991, p. 5. Interestingly, despite this ofﬁcial position, a UNHCR ofﬁcial has recently
argued that there should be a three-step approach to IFA determination, with the ﬁrst question being whether the asylum-seeker has ‘prove[n] a reasonable possibility of being persecuted throughout the country of origin’. If so, ‘this proves that his or her fear is well-founded’:
H. Massey, ‘Reasonableness Rescued? The Michigan Guidelines on the “Internal Protection Alternative” and UNHCR’s Position on “Relocating Internally as a Reasonable Alternative to Seeking Asylum”’ (draft working manuscript dated May 2001) (hereinafter ‘Massey’), p. 4 (on ﬁle
with authors).
33 Decision No. A70-684-022, BIA, 21 Feb. 1997, at p. 5. See also, Matter of R., Interim Decision
No. 3195, BIA, 15 Dec. 1992, wherein the Board stated that ‘while it is not always necessary to
demonstrate a country-wide fear, it is the exception rather than the rule that one can qualify as a
refugee without such a showing’; and In Re A.E.M., BIA, Interim Decision No. 3338, 20 Feb. 1998,
in which the BIA held that ‘in light of the country conditions . . . [revealing] that the Shining Path
operates in only a few areas of Peru, the respondents have not provided any evidence to suggest
that their fear of persecution from the Shining Path would exist throughout that country’. See
also, US Regulations, above n. 3. The IAT in the UK has taken a similar approach in interpreting a rule incorporating para. 91 of the Handbook into domestic regulations, which provide that
‘a successful asylum claim require[s] the applicant to establish persecution in all parts of the
country to which it was “practical” to return’: Dupovac, Decision No. R11846, IAT, 8 Feb. 1995.
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Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit afﬁrmed the rejection of
a Nigerian man’s appeal, holding that the appellant had erred in his application before the Board of Immigration Appeals in failing to allege that he would be unable
to live safely in another part of the country. The Court concluded:
[I]n this case the Board correctly decided Etugh had not made out a prima
facie case for asylum. Etugh failed to allege he would be persecuted beyond
the local vicinity of his hometown, Akirika . . . The scope of persecution
Etugh alleges is not national and does not sustain his motion to reopen.34

This approach is not justiﬁed by the text of the 1951 Convention; rather it
requires additional restrictive words to be read into the Convention deﬁnition
such that it reads ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted throughout the country of
nationality’.35 Moreover, it imposes an extremely onerous burden on refugee applicants, a burden that is exacerbated by the many practical restrictions applicants
often suffer in being able to obtain access to sufﬁciently precise and comprehensive country information. UNHCR has consistently criticized the country-wide persecution notion,36 describing this requirement as ‘an impossible burden and one
which is patently at odds with the refugee deﬁnition, the key criterion of which is
that the asylum seeker show that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason’.37 Indeed, it is in direct conﬂict with the wellestablished approach to distributing the burden of proof in refugee cases, which
UNHCR explains as follows:
[W]hile the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty
to ascertain and evaluate all the facts is shared between the applicant and
the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the
means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the
application.38

The ‘country-wide persecution’ approach also tends to produce a wide-ranging
ﬁshing expedition into potential alternative protection regions, and risks ‘the
conﬂation of issues’ and a ‘consequent lack of focused analysis’.39
34 Etugh v. INS, above n. 14.
35 See H. Storey, ‘The Internal Flight Alternative Test: The Jurisprudence Re-examined’, 10
International Journal of Refugee Law, 1998, p. 499 at p. 524. Interestingly, this is the approach impliedly embraced by the Massey paper, above n. 32, where he cites the ‘Michigan Guidelines’ as
referring to a well-founded fear of being persecuted in one region or at least part of the country of origin. He then says that ‘[t]his phraseology begs the question whether, according to the
Guidelines, proving a risk of persecution in one part of the country of origin actually proves that
the asylum-seeker’s fear is overall well-founded within the meaning of the refugee deﬁnition or
establishes only a presumption to this effect’: p. 4.
36 Concern with this notion can be traced back to at least the 1991 statement, above n. 32.
37 UNHCR, ‘Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’,
April 2001 (hereinafter ‘UNHCR 2001 Note on Interpreting Article 1’), at n. 28.
38 Handbook, above n. 11, at para. 196.
39 Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n. 31, p. 476, per Sedley LJ.
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By contrast, analyzing the IFA as a protection alternative provides structure to
the determination exercise and encourages a logical, methodical approach to the
determination process.40 It is thus of considerable assistance to decision makers as
well as to applicants. A protection-based understanding of IFA reinforces the fact
that once the applicant has established a well-founded fear in one location, she is
entitled to the full weight of the establishment of a prima facie case. In this way, the
IFA analysis is understood as akin to an exclusion inquiry such that the evidentiary
burden is then on the party asserting an IFA to establish that it exists.
A second major practical concern is that conceiving the IFA issue as part of the
initial inquiry into the existence of a well-founded fear of being persecuted encourages decision makers to pre-empt the analysis of well-founded fear in the ﬁrst region by moving directly to the question of an IFA. Although UNHCR emphasizes
that it is wrong to use IFA analysis to deny access to refugee status determination41
or as an ‘easy answer’ or ‘short-cut’ to bypass refugee status determination,42 situating the issue as part of the well-founded fear analysis tends to produce precisely
this result. There are many examples of decision makers relying upon the existence of an IFA to dismiss a claim without considering the conditions giving rise
to the well-founded fear in the region of origin.43 For example, in Syan v. Refugee
Review Tribunal and Another, the Australian Federal Court held that, ‘having found
against the appellant on the question of internal ﬂight, it was not necessary to determine whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
Convention reason’.44 This afﬁrmed the existing practice of the Refugee Review
Tribunal, which has dismissed a number of cases on the preliminary issue of IFA
without even considering the particulars of the applicant’s well-founded fear of
being persecuted.45 Similarly, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
40 The four steps in IPA assessment are set out in the text below at notes 112–85 and summarized
in the Michigan Guidelines, above n. 9.
41 UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above n. 22, at para. 2. See also, UNHCR ‘1995 Information
Note’, above n. 15, at section 6, where it is emphasized that ‘[d]ue to the complexity of the issues involved, the concept of internal ﬂight alternative should not be applied in the framework
of accelerated procedures’.
42 UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above n. 22, at para. 18.
43 See e.g., the decision in R. v. IAT, ex parte Probakaran, [1996] Imm AR 603, wherein the English
High Court (QBD) stated: ‘It seems to me that if there is a safe place, from a Convention point of
view, to which a person can be returned within his own country, it may in a number of cases be
unimportant whether he would be at risk of persecution for a Convention reason in the part of
that country from which he had come. The only relevance of whether there might be a risk of persecution for a Convention reason would be whether that risk established the question of whether
it was shown to be unreasonable to require that the asylum seeker go back to the safe part of his
country’: p. 604. See also, R. v. IAT, ex parte Mahendran, English Court of Appeal, Decision of 13 July
1999 (unreported decision on ﬁle with authors), holding that, even when an adjudicator errs on
a credibility ﬁnding, an appeal can be dismissed because IFA can be an independent stand-alone
inquiry.
44 (1995) 61 FCR 284 at 288, per Beazley J.
45 See e.g. Decision No. V98/08482, Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), 31 March 1999: ‘As
the Tribunal has found that internal ﬂight is a viable option . . . the Tribunal has not proceeded
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Singh, the English High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) held that ‘the alternative ﬂight option is a point that, on its own, would conclude this application
against the applicant’.46
This approach is a dangerous one, since an analysis of an IFA requires ‘an indepth examination to establish whether the persecution faced by the applicant is
clearly limited to a speciﬁc area and that effective protection is available in other
parts of the country’.47 This concern is well exempliﬁed in R. v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Akar, in which a Kurdish woman claiming asylum on
the basis that she and her family had supported the Kurdish separatist PKK was
denied asylum by the adjudicator on IFA grounds alone and in the absence of an
evaluation of all the evidence relating to the extent and nature of her well-founded
fear of persecution. On an application for judicial review, the English High Court
of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) dismissed her submissions, approving the use
of IFA as a threshold inquiry as follows:
The third matter is that the Applicant contends that there were various errors
of fact and that various items of background documentation were ignored. In
my judgment, the Special Adjudicator was entitled, in the circumstances of
this case, to focus as he did on the circumstances in Istanbul, on the existence
of the two brothers in Istanbul, and to conclude from all the matters before
him that there was no reason why this lady could not safely and reasonably
live in Istanbul with them, particularly as the personal persecution of which
she had experience related to life in the village.48

This decision must be open to question given the allegations of the applicant
as to the basis of her well-founded fear. It is inherent in the notion of an internal
alternative that the decision maker ﬁrst understands the conditions to which the
safe region is said to be a suitable alternative. On the one hand, by commencing
the inquiry with an assessment of the well-founded fear in the region from which
the person ﬂed before moving to the protection question, the decision maker has a
clear benchmark against which to assess the sufﬁciency of the internal protection
available to the applicant. To locate the analysis within the well-founded fear criterion, on the other hand, allows the decision maker to avoid this careful analysis,
and raises a substantial risk that legitimate claims will be dismissed following only
cursory consideration of the relevant circumstances.
to determine whether the applicant otherwise satisﬁed the Convention deﬁnition of a refugee’;
and Decision No. V98/08414, RRT, May 1999, in which it was held that ‘[i]t is not necessary for
the Tribunal to determine whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution in part of a country
before a relocation may be considered’.
46 Decision No. CO/2696/98, English High Court (QBD), 3 March 1999, per Scott Baker J (unreported decision on ﬁle with authors).
47 Decision No. 70951/98, New Zealand RSAA, 5 Aug. 1998.
48 Decision No. CO/1789/99, English High Court (QBD), 17 Sept. 1999 (unreported decision on ﬁle
with authors).
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In summary, to hold that the availability of alternative internal protection removes the well-founded fear of being persecuted involves a legal ﬁction which
has concrete detrimental ramiﬁcations for refugee applicants. It is both more logical and linguistically satisfactory to view IFA analysis as relevant to the question
whether national protection is available to counter the well-founded fear.49 This
language of the 1951 Convention naturally supports such a conceptualization of an
IFA, which is moreover consistent with the well-established view of refugee law as
surrogate protection.50 Indeed, to collapse protection considerations into the wellfounded fear element makes the protection aspect of the deﬁnition largely superﬂuous.
The main objection51 that has been raised to an understanding of IFA rooted in
the 1951 Convention’s protection clause is that it impermissibly extends the notion
49 According to the EU Joint Position, above n. 3, at section. 8:
Where it appears that persecution is clearly conﬁned to a speciﬁc part of a country’s
territory, it may be necessary, in order to check that the condition laid down in Article
1A of the Geneva Convention has been fulﬁlled, namely that the person concerned ‘is
unable or, owing to such fear (of persecution), is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country’, to ascertain whether the person concerned cannot ﬁnd
effective protection in another part of his own country, to which he may be reasonably
expected to move.
50 Hathaway, Refugee Status, above n. 4, p. 133. This understanding has been endorsed in Applicant
A. and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another, (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 248,
where Dawson J held that it is a ‘well-accepted fact that international refugee law was meant to
serve as a “substitute” for national protection where the latter was not provided due to discrimination against persons on grounds of either civil or political status’; Canada (Attorney-General) v.
Ward, above n. 5, p. 731 per La Forest J: ‘[I]nternational refugee law was meant to serve as a “substitute” for national protection where the latter was not provided’; Horvath v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, above n. 27, p. 581 per Lord Hope: ‘The general purpose of the Convention
is to enable a person who no longer has the beneﬁt of protection against persecution for a Convention reason in his own country to turn for protection to the international community’; at
p. 589 per Lord Lloyd: ‘Thus the principle of surrogate protection ﬁnds its proper place in the
second half of article 1A(2). If there is a failure of protection by the country of origin, the applicant will be unable to avail himself of that country’s protection’; at p. 594 per Lord Clyde. But
two judges of the High Court of Australia have recently challenged this view, ﬁnding that the
notion of refugee law as surrogate protection ‘add[s] a layer of complexity . . . which is an unnecessary distraction’: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar and Others, above
n. 27, at para. 73, per McHugh and Gummow JJ.
51 It has been argued that a second concern is that there is no ‘protection clause’ in the portion of
the refugee deﬁnition which addresses the claims to refugee status made by stateless persons.
A stateless person need only show that he or she ‘is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to [the country of former habitual residence]’. If the ‘protection clause’ contained in
the portion of the refugee deﬁnition applicable to persons with a nationality is the sole basis
to engage in analysis of the internal protection alternative, it would not be possible to canvass
internal protection alternatives in relation to a stateless person. Yet this result may well make
sense. The right to internal freedom of movement within a state does not inhere in all persons,
but only in persons ‘lawfully within the territory of a State’: International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 (hereinafter ‘ICCPR’), at Art.
12(1). Indeed, the right to re-enter a State cannot even be asserted as a matter of international
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of ‘protection’ beyond that intended by the framers of the 1951 Convention. It has
been argued by Antonio Fortı́n that historical evidence suggests that the concept of
‘protection’ in the deﬁnition was intended to refer solely to diplomatic protection,
rather than to internal national protection.52 This leads him to conclude that, in
light of the stipulation of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that
‘special meaning shall be given to a term [of a treaty] if it is established that the parties so intended’,53 the reference to ‘protection’ in the refugee deﬁnition should be
read as ‘diplomatic protection’. The argument is that refugee status is dependent
upon whether or not a person can avail him or herself of the diplomatic protection
of his or her country of nationality, the implication being that availability of this external protection obviates the need for surrogate protection, regardless of the risks
that await an individual in the country of origin.
There are a number of signiﬁcant problems with this analysis. First and most obviously, the extended term ‘diplomatic protection’ does not appear in the text of
the 1951 Convention itself. Taking account of both the ordinary meaning of the
legal entitlement by non-citizens: ICCPR, Art. 12(4). Thus, because only a citizen is by deﬁnition
both entitled to re-enter his or her country and to move and establish residence in any part of
that State, there are good grounds not to engage in an internal protection analysis with respect
to stateless persons. Such an inquiry is predicated on a legal right to re-enter both the State and
a given region thereof, neither of which may be presumed in the case of a stateless person.
52 A. Fortı́n, ‘The Meaning of “Protection” in the Refugee Deﬁnition’, 12(4) International Journal of
Refugee Law, 2000, p. 548 at p. 551 (hereinafter ‘Fortı́n’). Two judges in the majority of a recent
decision of the High Court of Australia, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar
and Others, above n. 27, have relied upon this historical interpretation. While Gleeson CJ accepted
that the historical meaning of ‘protection’ was diplomatic or consular protection, he also considered that there is a broader sense in which the term ‘protection’ is used in the Convention (para.
17), citing in support, inter alia, the judgment of Lord Hope of Craighead in Horvath v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department in which his Lordship explained that ‘in the case of an allegation of
persecution by non-state agents the failure of the state to provide the protection is nevertheless
an essential element’ (para. 19). Gleeson CJ explained that the ‘broader sense of protection’ may
be of signiﬁcance in interpreting various aspects of the Convention today, explaining: ‘on the
questions whether persecution is a threat, (which usually involves consideration of what has occurred in the past as a basis for looking at the future), and whether such persecution is by reason
of one of the Convention grounds, and whether fear of persecution is well-founded, the obligation of a state to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of those who are entitled to its
protection may be of signiﬁcance’ (para. 24). In applying this analysis, he appeared to accept the
‘bifurcated’ approach to the meaning of ‘being persecuted’ (para. 31), cited above n. 27. Yet, while
arguing that the historical meaning of protection was external protection, Kälin acknowledges
that ‘the very cornerstone of the regime of international refugee protection’ is ‘surrogate protection created by modern international refugee law’: Kälin, below n. 59, p. 431. Moreover, Kälin
recognizes that, ‘in international law, the “historical” interpretation of international treaties is
only a supplementary means of determining the content of a treaty provision’ and he provides
‘strong reasons’ for supporting a contemporary interpretation of the 1951 Convention that gives
the protection clause ‘an extended meaning that also covers internal protection’ (ibid., at pp.
427–8). This is consistent with the general approach to interpretation of the 1951 Convention.
As Kirby J of the High Court of Australia has explained: ‘[l]ike the language itself, the Convention moves with the times’: Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000)
201 CLR 293 at 312.
53 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 31(4).

374

Internal protection/relocation/ﬂight alternative

notion of ‘protection’54 and the ways in which the term ‘protection’ is used elsewhere in the 1951 Convention, the Fortı́n position is anomalous. In particular, the
Preamble refers to the intention of the parties to ‘revise and consolidate previous
international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope
of and the protection afforded by such instruments’, and to the importance of coordinated measures to facilitate UNHCR’s task of ‘supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees’.55 Clearly, ‘protection’ as referred to
in the Preamble cannot mean only ‘diplomatic protection’, since the Convention is
concerned nearly exclusively with the provision of ‘protection’ understood in the
sense of human rights protection.
Secondly, the isolated historical references that can be located do not justify the
conclusion that the framers of the 1951 Convention clearly had this highly specialized understanding of ‘protection’ in mind. During the early phases of the drafting
process, the goal had been to draft a single convention to govern the status of both
refugees and stateless persons. Statements were therefore made during the early
debates of the Ad Hoc Committee which appear to support Fortı́n’s position, but
only because they were addressed to the circumstances in which a stateless person
(not a refugee) could be deemed not to require international protection.56 In the
case of a stateless person – but not for a refugee – the willingness of a country’s
diplomatic personnel to enfranchise him or her by the provision of, for example,
54 Protection is deﬁned as ‘the act or an instance of protecting, the state of being protected’; while
‘protect’ is deﬁned as ‘keep safe; defend; guard’: Concise Oxford Dictionary (9th edn, Oxford University Press, 1995). See also Lay Kon Tji v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1998) 158 ALR
681, where Finkelstein J of the Federal Court of Australia surveyed the various forms of ‘protection’ which comprise the enjoyment of ‘effective nationality’ in the context of an application for
refugee status by a dual national, noting that ‘protection of the subject operates at two levels,
viz., the domestic and the international’ (at p. 690).
55 1951 Convention, Preamble.
56 The Ad Hoc Committee debated during its ﬁrst session in Jan. and Feb. 1950 the question
whether the 1951 Convention should deal with the problem of statelessness, ultimately deciding that the 1951 Convention should deal only with refugees. To the extent that the references
cited are to discussions which occurred before the issue of statelessness was excluded from the
1951 Convention, they are of questionable value in shedding light on the goals of the 1951 Convention. For example, Fortı́n states that the Secretary-General ‘postulated the need to establish
an organization to provide to refugees the diplomatic protection that they lacked’: Fortı́n, above
n. 52, p. 560. However the supporting quote of the Secretary-General states: ‘The conferment
of a status is not sufﬁcient in itself to regularize the standing of stateless persons and to bring
them into the orbit of the law; they must also be linked to an independent organ which would
to some extent make up for the absence of national protection and render them certain services
which the authorities of a country of origin render to their nationals abroad’: Fortı́n, above n. 52,
p. 560 (emphasis added). Similarly, Fortı́n argues that the Director-General of the International
Refugee Organization recalled that refugees are ‘unprotected aliens’ insofar as they lack the protection which States grant to their nationals abroad, Fortı́n, above n. 52, p. 560. However the actual quote cited by Fortı́n states: ‘The refugee who enjoys no nationality is placed in an abnormal
and inferior position which not only reduces his social value, but destroys his self-conﬁdence’
(emphasis added).
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a passport or entry visa might well be taken as indicative of a resolution to that person’s dilemma, and hence logically inform the question of whether international
protection is required. It is striking that once the decision to draft a separate convention on statelessness was made, there were only a few references made to the
legal signiﬁcance of ‘diplomatic protection’,57 and in fact very little discussion dedicated to the meaning of the ‘protection’ aspect of the deﬁnition at all.58 There is simply too little historical evidence59 to justify the conclusion that the authors of the
1951 Convention ‘speciﬁcally assigned to the term “protection” the special meaning of “diplomatic protection”’.60 Moreover, it is possible to locate references in the
travaux préparatoires that support a ﬂexible and open-ended deﬁnition of ‘protection’. For example, in discussing the proposed Article 1C(3), Mr Hoare, the delegate
of the United Kingdom, argued that ‘it would be better to say “enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality”, for that would leave the State concerned
to decide whether the refugee in fact enjoyed such protection, and how the phrase
should be interpreted’.61
Thirdly, even if it were somehow shown that the special meaning of ‘diplomatic
protection’ should inform the 1951 Convention’s general references to ‘protection’,
the Fortı́n view misinterprets the notion of diplomatic protection under international law. The well-established meaning of ‘diplomatic protection’ in international law is that it is ‘action taken by a State against another State in respect of an
injury to the person or property of a national caused by an internationally wrongful
act or omission attributable to the latter State’.62 This is a considerably narrower
57 Fortı́n cites the views of the US representative, Mr Henkin, who viewed protection as a ‘term
of art’ (Fortı́n, above n. 52, p. 562), as well as the less direct statements by the Acting President
of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Mr Humphrey (p. 563), and the representative of Israel,
Mr Robinson (p. 561).
58 It is clear from reading the travaux préparatoires that the important and controversial issues in relation to Art. 1 were the temporal and geographical restrictions imposed in the 1951 Convention
and the issue of how closely to deﬁne the Convention grounds. There was no extensive discussion
of the meaning of ‘protection’.
59 Apart from the three quotes from the travaux referred to above at n. 56, Fortı́n bases his assertions
largely on secondary sources. W. Kälin, also a proponent of the view that the historical meaning
of protection was ‘diplomatic protection’, makes reference to the record of the Ad Hoc Committee in which it is stated that ‘unable’ referred to refugees possessing a nationality who are refused passports ‘or other protection by their own government’, W. Kälin, ‘Non-State Agents of
Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect’, 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2001,
p. 415 at p. 425. Yet this reference hardly seems dispositive, since the reference to ‘other protection’ is clearly open-ended.
60 Fortı́n, above n. 52, p. 551.
61 UN General Assembly, ‘Summary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting Held at the Palais des
Nations, Geneva, on Monday, 16 July 1951’, UN doc. A/Conf.2/SR.23, p. 19.
62 See J. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, ‘First Report on Diplomatic Protection’, 52nd Session of
the International Law Commission (ILC), UN doc. A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, at Art. 1. It
is important to note that this Article is not an example of progressive development on the
part of the ILC, but rather a codiﬁcation of existing international law: see M. Bennouna,
Special Rapporteur, ‘Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection’, 50th Session of the ILC,
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concept than that advocated by proponents of the ‘protection equals diplomatic
protection’ view in the refugee context. The precise outer parameters of the constructed notion of diplomatic protection are not clear, although it is said to include the provision of administrative assistance such as the issuance of passports
and other documents. Thus, not only do proponents of this view seek to read additional words into the Convention text, but they also substitute the precise and
well-established understanding of the term created by the addition of these words
with a modiﬁed and expanded version of this term of art in international law.63 This
analysis simply cannot be maintained as a matter of treaty interpretation.
Fourthly, it is difﬁcult to justify the ‘diplomatic protection’ interpretation as
being consistent with the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention (a primary requirement of treaty interpretation), since its relevance to refugee status is not clear.
As the right to exercise diplomatic protection is a wholly discretionary right belonging to the State, which is exercised to ensure that international laws are observed,64
UN doc. A/CN.4/484, 4 Feb. 1998, at para. 5. The most frequently cited case as authority for the
well-established narrow deﬁnition of diplomatic protection in international law is Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 2, 30 Aug. 1924.
63 See Report of the ILC on the Work of its 49th Session, 12 May–18 July 1997, UN doc. A/52/10,
at para. 178, where ‘diplomatic protection’ is described as a ‘term of art’ within the meaning set
out in Mavrommatis, above n. 62. Yet Fortı́n, above n. 52, p. 554, argues:
It is generally agreed that, in addition to what has been described above [i.e. the true
meaning of diplomatic protection], it encompasses certain actions that diplomatic and
consular representatives may undertake in order to ensure better standards of
treatment for the nationals of the country abroad, as well as the provision of so-called
‘administrative assistance’ to nationals abroad, meaning the issuance and
authentication of certiﬁcates, the issuance and renewal of passports and so forth.
There is no case law cited in support of the general agreement adverted to and the position is
entirely at odds with the work of the ILC in this area. Fortı́n quotes an ILC report in support of
his proposition; however the passage cited contradicts rather than supports his understanding of
the meaning of ‘diplomatic protection’. The passage quoted distinguishes between diplomatic
protection ‘properly so called, that is to say a formal claim made by a State in respect of an injury to
one of its nationals which has not been redressed through local remedies’ (emphasis added) and
other diplomatic functions: see Fortı́n, above n. 52, p. 555. The passage is taken from the
Report of the ILC on the Work of its 49th Session, and is followed, in the ILC report, by a clear
exposition of the narrow basis of diplomatic protection at international law: ibid., paras. 182–3.
Indeed, in a subsequent report (Bennouna, above n. 62), the ILC noted: ‘However, as noted by the
Commission’s working group, diplomatic protection strictu sensu is very different from the diplomatic mission or consular functions exercised by the sending State in order to assist its nationals
or protect their interests in the receiving country’ (at para. 12).
64 See, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, above n. 62, p. 12, where the Permanent Court of
International Justice stated:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another
State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary
channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting
its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
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the decision of a State not to exercise diplomatic protection in relation to one of its
nationals may have no bearing whatever on whether it could provide internal protection to the national.65 Rather, the decision whether or not to exercise diplomatic
protection may reﬂect considerations of domestic or international politics that have
no relationship to the ability of a State to protect its nationals internally. Thus, arguing that refugee status should turn upon the willingness or ability of the State to
exercise diplomatic protection is illogical.
Fifthly, the availability of diplomatic protection does not necessarily bear any relationship whatsoever to the question of whether a State would wish to protect an
individual against a well-founded fear of being persecuted.66 As Grahl-Madsen has
succinctly explained:
It is entirely conceivable that a person may have well-founded fear of being
persecuted upon his eventual return to the country of his nationality, yet he
may have nothing to fear at the hands of the members of the foreign service of
that country. The Convention would, in fact, be rendered meaningless if a
person’s claim to refugee status should depend on whether the diplomats or

As Bennouna, above n. 62, at para. 19, explained:
In the traditional view [of diplomatic protection], the endorsement of a claim is a
discretionary right of the State of nationality, which has complete latitude to accept or
reject it ‘without being required to justify its decision in any way whatsoever’ e.g.,
without having to rely on the unfounded nature of the claim or on its foreign policy
needs.
See also Dugard, above n. 62, ILC draft Article 3 and commentary at paras. 61–74. While the
traditional view that diplomatic protection is a right of the State has been subject to criticism in
recent years, it clearly remains the position in international law (ibid.).
65 This point was recognized by the Federal Court of Australia in Lay Kon Tji v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, above n. 54. In that case, Finkelstein J found that the potential inability of
Portugal to provide diplomatic protection would not render it a State that is incapable of providing effective nationality such that it ought not to be deemed a country of second nationality pursuant to Art. 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. This was because: ‘[A] national does not have a right
to diplomatic protection from his or her State; that is, it is not a right of nationality. Diplomatic
protection is the right of the State to intervene on behalf of its nationals. The State has complete
discretion whether to exercise this right and is not in any way bound to protect its nationals’
(at p. 693). See also, N. Nathwami, ‘The Purpose of Asylum’, 12(3) International Journal of Refugee
Law, 2000, p. 354 at p. 359.
66 Indeed, this point is acknowledged by one of the proponents of the historical view of protection
as ‘diplomatic protection’:
Conceptually, it is conceivable that a victim of persecution by non-state actors [which]
cannot be stopped by the authorities may be forced to leave his or her country of origin
but is able and willing to live abroad as an alien enjoying full external protection by his
country. In such cases he or she would be in a situation similar to that of many migrants
who are forced to go abroad in order to survive economically but are not in need of
surrogate international protection.
Kälin, above n. 59, p. 426.
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consular ofﬁcers of his home country were likely to persecute him should he
ever ask them for protection or assistance.67

Indeed, the diplomatic protection thesis allows the unilateral action of the State
of nationality to remove the refugee’s right to protection, a position irreconcilable
with Article 1C(1) which denies status only where the refugee voluntary re-avails
him or herself of the protection by the State of nationality.68
Sixthly, the 1969 Vienna Convention speciﬁcally directs attention to subsequent
practice in the application of a treaty which establishes agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. Accordingly, reference to the leading cases in common
law jurisdictions reveals that the narrow ‘diplomatic protection’ approach is inconsistent with a growing body of jurisprudence that recognizes that the object of
the 1951 Convention is ‘surely to afford protection and fair treatment to those for
whom neither is available in their own country’.69 Whatever the historical origins
of the protection clause, the concept of refugee law as providing surrogate or substitute protection is now accepted by most senior courts in the common law world,
having been described as a ‘well-accepted fact’.70 In the speciﬁc context of IFA analysis, there is also growing consensus that the ‘protection’ aspect of the deﬁnition
is the appropriate place for situating the analysis of internal alternative national
protection. As framed by Lee J of the Australian Federal Court:
To put it [the IPA question] in the terms of the Convention deﬁnition, if the
applicant is outside the country of his nationality because of a well-founded
fear of persecution, is he unable to avail himself of the protection of that
country? That . . . question . . . involves consideration of the applicant’s
circumstances as they are now and his ability to return to his country of
nationality and obtain protection.71
67 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966), vol. I,
p. 257.
68 This is because diplomatic protection is not a right of the individual; therefore the individual
‘cannot renounce it effectively’ (Nathwami, above n. 65, p. 358). Rather, the right to exercise
diplomatic protection is a right of the State: see above n. 64. Nathwami explains: ‘If diplomatic
protection were a crucial criterion for determining refugee status, the State of origin might grant
diplomatic protection over the head of the refugee and, thus, obstruct the grant of asylum to the
refugee’ (ibid.). While it is true that the kinds of considerations normally referred to in relation to
Art. 1C(1) relate to ‘external’ protection (such as consular assistance), this does not suggest that
protection means external protection alone. As G. S. Goodwin-Gill argues, there is no reason why
protection cannot refer both to diplomatic protection and internal protection, depending on the
context: G. S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd edn, Clarendon, Oxford, 1996),
pp. 15–16 and 79.
69 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran, House of Lords, [1988] 1 All ER
193 at 196 per Lord Keith of Kinkel. See Vienna Convention, above n. 53, Art. 31(3)(b).
70 Applicant A. and Another v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and Another, above n. 50, per
Dawson J. See generally the cases cited above in nn. 50 and 52.
71 Al-Amidi v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 177 ALR 506 at 510. See also,
Randhawa v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, above n. 14, pp. 268–9;
Butler v. Attorney-General, New Zealand Court of Appeal, [1999] NZAR 205; Karanakaran v.
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Finally, the assertion that ‘protection’ should be understood as ‘diplomatic protection’ is also out of step with most72 contemporary pronouncements of UNHCR
as manifested in its ofﬁcial documents,73 outreach materials,74 and interventions
Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n. 31; Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
English Court of Appeal, [1997] 2 All ER 723; Islam v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, Federal Court of Australia, (2000) 171 ALR 267. The same view is adopted in the EU Joint
Position, above n. 3, at section 8 (cited above n. 49).
72 In one recent statement, UNHCR has unfortunately endorsed the diplomatic protection approach on the basis that ‘[u]nwillingness to avail oneself of this external [diplomatic] protection
is understood to mean unwillingness to expose oneself to the possibility of being returned to the
country of nationality where the feared persecution could occur’: UNHCR, ‘2001 Note on Interpreting Article 1’, above n. 37, at para. 35. Yet because the availability of diplomatic protection
similarly has no bearing on the question of removeability, this explanation for the ‘diplomatic
protection’ position does not withstand scrutiny.
73 It is argued by Fortı́n, above n. 52, and more recently by Massey, above n. 32, p. 4 (relying on
Fortı́n) that the diplomatic protection thesis is the UNHCR’s ‘long-held understanding’ of the
meaning of protection, and that any inconsistency with this approach was ‘temporary’: Massey,
above n. 32, at n. 18. This assertion is not accurate. For example, the UNHCR Handbook, above
n. 11, takes a ﬂexible approach to the deﬁnition of ‘protection’. In para. 65, the discussion of
agents of persecution strongly suggests that protection means internal protection: ‘Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be
considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.’ The protection phrase is speciﬁcally
considered at paras. 97–100, and while ‘external’ protection is envisaged as being encompassed
within the phrase, it is by no means said to be conﬁned to external protection. For example,
para. 99 states:
What constitutes a refusal of protection must be determined according to the
circumstances of the case. If it appears that the applicant has been denied services
(e.g., refusal of a national passport or extension of its validity, or denial of admittance to
the home territory) normally accorded to his co-nationals, this may constitute a refusal
of protection within the deﬁnition.
To the same effect, see UNHCR, ‘1995 Information Note’, above n. 15, at section 5, in which
UNHCR states: ‘The essential issue in establishing the basis and justiﬁcation for the extension
of international protection is the fact of an absence of national protection against persecution,
whether or not this deﬁciency can be attributed to an afﬁrmative intention to harm on the part
of the State.’ In its 1995 Overview, above n. 18, pp. 28–9, UNHCR stated that:
the decisive criterion for refugee status is that an individual having a well-founded fear
of persecution is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his
country of origin. Thus the essential element for the extension of international
protection is the absence of national protection against persecution, irrespective of
whether this absence can be attributed to an afﬁrmative intention to harm on the part of
the state. A situation in which the state is incapable of providing national protection
against persecution by non-government agents clearly renders the individual unable to
avail himself of the protection of his country of origin.
Thus, at least from 1979 to 1995, UNHCR appears to have favoured a broader understanding of
‘protection’.
74 For example, in a segment answering ‘frequently asked questions’ on the UNHCR website, the
question, ‘What is protection?’ is answered as follows:
Governments normally protect their citizens, assuring them their right to life, freedom
and physical security. When governments are unable or unwilling to do so and
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in domestic adjudication.75 In all these contexts, UNHCR insists that ‘protection’
in the Convention sense corresponds with the ordinary meaning of that word, not
with ‘diplomatic protection’. As explained in the 1994 Note on International Protection submitted by the High Commissioner to the Executive Committee:
Unlike most other people who leave their country, refugees seek admission to
another country not out of choice but out of absolute necessity, to escape
threats to their most fundamental human rights from which the authorities
of their home country cannot or will not protect them. Left unprotected by
their own Government, refugees must seek the protection that every human
being requires from the authorities of a country of refuge and from the
international community. It is this vital need for international protection
that most clearly distinguishes refugees from other aliens.76

In sum, there is simply no compelling reason to force a narrow, decontextualized
reading of ‘protection’onto the 1951 Convention. Giving the term ‘protection’its
ordinary meaning is consistent with the UNHCR’s traditional view that the
terms of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol should be interpreted consistently
with
individual human rights are violated, people are forced to ﬂee to another country. Since
by deﬁnition, refugees are protected by their governments, the international
community steps in to ensure the individual’s rights and physical safety.
‘The 1951 Convention: Lasting Cornerstone of Refugee Protection’, accessed in Aug. 2001 at
http://www.unhcr.org
In another section on the UNHCR website, it is said:
What sets refugees apart from other people who may be in need of humanitarian aid is
their need for international protection. Most people can look to their own government
and state institutions to protect their rights and physical security, even if imperfectly.
Refugees cannot. In many cases, they are ﬂeeing in terror from abuses perpetrated by
the state. In other instances, they are escaping from oppression that the state is
powerless to prevent, because it has lost control of territory or otherwise ceased to
function in an effective way. By deﬁnition, refugees cannot beneﬁt from the protection
of their own government.
‘Issues: Asylum and Protection’ accessed in Aug. 2001 at http://www.unhcr.org.
75 See e.g. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, above n. 5, p. 711, in which UNHCR intervened to
argue that:
the distinction between ‘unable’and ‘unwilling’is irrelevant to this appeal, that there is
no requirement for state complicity in the deﬁnition, and that the proper focus should
be on whether the claimant, because of the state’s inability to protect, is ‘unable’or
‘unwilling’to seek the protection of the authorities in his or her home state. The High
Commissioner also endorses the position of the Board that the absence of protection
may create a sufﬁcient evidentiary basis for a presumption of a well-founded fear by the
claimant.
Emphasis in original.
76 UNHCR, ‘Note on International Protection Submitted by the High Commissioner’, Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 45th Session, UN doc. A/AC.96/830,
7 Sept. 1994,atpara. 8. See also, paras. 1, 10, 11, and 22.
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‘the generous spirit in which they were conceived’, so as to have an inclusive rather
than restrictive meaning.77

IV.

The logic of a shift to ‘internal protection alternative’

To this point we have established that, as a matter of principle, an understanding of refugee law as surrogate protection compels the view that if national
protection can be delivered in some, but not all, parts of the State of origin, then
refugee law should be applied in a way that recognizes the extant realities and possibilities for individuals and groups to beneﬁt from the protection of their own country. While the existence of an internal alternative to asylum has sometimes been
argued to defeat the existence of a well-founded fear of being persecuted, we have
shown the dangers of such an approach – in particular, the tendency of States taking this view to impose a nearly impossible afﬁrmative duty on asylum applicants to
demonstrate a country-wide risk of being persecuted, and the implied legitimation
of using the IFA inquiry to short-circuit a careful consideration of the afﬁrmative elements of the refugee claim. In contrast, for the reasons set out in Section III, it is
both more logical and linguistically satisfactory to view IFA analysis as relevant to
the question whether national protection is available to counter the well-founded
fear shown to exist in the applicant’s region of origin.
The question remains, however, why we view it as important not only to clarify
the appropriate textual home for the analysis of internal options to asylum, but
also to propose a decisive shift in nomenclature and substantive focus – discarding the ‘internal ﬂight alternative’ and ‘internal relocation alternative’ labels in
favour of the notion of an ‘internal protection alternative’ (IPA), and rejecting the
current UNHCR recommendation to analyze whether it is ‘reasonable’ to require
the claimant to avail himself or herself of ‘safety’ in the proposed internal destination in favour of a commitment to assess the sufﬁciency of the protection which is
accessible to the asylum seeker there. We set out our thinking on these points in this
Part.
First, the use of the phrase ‘internal ﬂight’ connotes a misconceived conceptual
framework, suggesting as it does that the inquiry is to some extent retrospective.78
77 UNHCR, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’, UN doc. E/1995/52,
25 April 1995, p. 9.
78 According to H. Storey, above n. 29, p. 3: ‘Some leading cases still cited . . . treat the IFA/IPA test
as one of past ﬂight. It would be useful to put paid to this misconception once and for all . . .
[The] [c]entral focus must . . . be on the question of whether upon return a person would be able
to relocate to another part of the country of nationality.’ But see R. Marx, ‘Comments on James
C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, Internal Protection/Relocation/Flight as an Aspect of Refugee
Status Determination’, 31 Aug. 2001 (on ﬁle with authors). Marx argues that the phrase ‘internal
ﬂight alternative’ is to be preferred precisely because it restricts application of the principle to
persons who had an internal option at the time they entered the asylum State. Protection options
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As adverted to in Section III, there is no justiﬁcation in the Convention text for an
implied exclusion or punitive provision based upon a failure to explore internal options before seeking asylum.79 Moreover, such an approach is inconsistent with the
well-accepted notion that refugee analysis is concerned with future risk of persecution, and thus with assessment of risk at the date of determination.80 Although
the current UNHCR formulation and most State practice now assume a prospective
analysis, the continued use of the phrase ‘internal ﬂight’ is dangerous.81 For example, some States have used the notion as an aspect of ﬁndings on credibility, arguing
that, as the refugee claimant did not ‘ﬂee’ internally, his or her claim for asylum
abroad is not genuine.82 Phrasing the question as whether a person can ‘relocate’
within his or her country of nationality, while constituting a signiﬁcant improvement on the notion of ‘internal ﬂight,’ also conceptualizes the inquiry in an incorrect manner. The legally relevant issue is not the ability of the refugee applicant
physically to move, but rather the degree of protection she or he will receive upon
which have arisen subsequent to that time, he argues, are relevant to the denial of refugee status
only if they allow the cessation criteria of Art. 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention to be met. A key
concern raised by this approach is the risk that refugee status could be denied to persons who
had a protection option at the time of arrival, but who by the time of status determination may
no longer have such an option. And while Marx is clearly correct that the declaratory nature of
refugee status argues against allowing governments to invoke IPA grounds which have emerged
during delays in processing refugee claims, in practice courts have resisted application of Art.
1C(5) criteria to even long-delayed initial status assessments. In the decision of Penate v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), Trial Division, [1994] 3 FC 79 at 94, Reed J of the Federal
Court of Canada observed that Art. 1C(5) speaks to:
the revoking of status after it has been granted and with respect to which . . . the
[government] and not the individual has the burden of proof. In my view, in the context
of the initial determination as to whether or not status will be granted, the question is a
different one. The question is not what type of changed country conditions are
necessary to justify the revoking of status. The question is whether the particular
changed circumstances are relevant to the applicant’s claim and how they relate
thereto.
79 See text above at nn. 11–12.
80 See e.g., Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Jama, Full Court of the Federal Court of
Australia, [1999] FCA 1680, 3 Dec. 1999, at para. 24:
[T]he objective facts to be considered in reaching a determination as to whether the
applicant’s fear is well-founded are not conﬁned to those which induced the fear. A
judgement must be made as to what may happen in the future, including any change in
current circumstances . . . There may be no current risk of persecution . . . yet a change
in circumstances may readily be foreseen that would create a signiﬁcant risk of
persecution.
81 Despite emphasizing the prospective nature of the analysis, UNHCR continues to refer to the
principle as an ‘alternative to ﬂight’: see UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above n. 22, at para. 11.
82 ECRE, ‘Position on the Interpretation of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention’, Sept. 2000. Conversely, Portuguese and Spanish authorities consider that the fact that an asylum seeker tried to
ﬁnd a safe area before leaving the country of origin can be considered an indication of the wellfoundedness of the asylum claim: ELENA Research Paper, n. 3, pp. 48–50.
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arrival in the alternative site.83 As neatly summarized by the New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeal Authority:
[T]o pose any question postulated on ‘internal ﬂight alternative’ is to ask the
wrong question. Rather, the question is one of protection and is to be
approached fairly and squarely in terms of the refugee deﬁnition, namely
whether the applicant ‘. . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country’.84

Secondly, since the focus is on protection, a term found in the Convention text
and an inherent part of the analysis of a claim to refugee status, additional terms
such as ‘safety’ and ‘reasonableness’ should not be made part of the test. These
terms are vague and open to vastly divergent subjective interpretation. Most importantly, reliance on the notion of ‘safety’ has produced highly questionable results in particular cases, as it has been interpreted as meaning considerably less than
‘protection’. For example, the Netherlands Rechtseenheidskamer takes the view that
northern Iraq constitutes an IFA85 even though UNHCR advises that the Kurdish
enclave in northern Iraq is ‘volatile and may change at any time’, the territory remains a part of Iraq, and NATO generals have conceded that they are not equipped
to prevent Saddam Hussein’s entry into the zone.86 Yet an analysis that asks only
whether an internal site is ‘safe’ is open to such a ﬁnding, since the question of
present and immediate safety may be construed to present a very low threshold. By
contrast, a protection inquiry is forward-looking and, as will become evident below,
is concerned with the durability of afﬁrmative protection, rather than simply the
immediate (and possibly short-term) ability to avoid persecution.87
The other key problem with the focus on the ability of an asylum seeker to ﬁnd
‘safety’ in the country of origin is that it may be understood to impose an effective

83 According to Linden J of the Federal Court of Canada, ‘A Brief Reaction to Hathaway’s Paper’,
Sept. 2001 (on ﬁle with the authors): ‘The advice to change the label of principles in this area
to Internal Protection Alternative is particularly helpful, for it will focus our attention on the
true issue that is involved here – whether protection can be obtained elsewhere in the country’; and L. D. Rosenberg of the US Board of Immigration Appeals, ‘Commentary on Internal
Flight/Protection Alternative’, Sept. 2001 (on ﬁle with the authors):
It is desirable to use ‘internal protection’ because that language emphasizes the fact
that it is protection that is at the center of the inquiry as to whether there should be
surrogate protection afforded by the receiving state. It is in determining whether
internal protection is available that we can conclude whether a refugee is in need, now,
of protection.
84 Re R.S., New Zealand RSAA, Decision No. 135/92, 18 June 1993.
85 See ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, pp. 40–1.
86 UNHCR, ‘Action Plan on the Inﬂux of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: UNHCR Observations’, memo to
the K4 Committee of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 21 April 1998, as cited in
Frelick, above n. 6, p. 26. See generally, Frelick, above n. 6, pp. 24–7.
87 See text below at n. 120, and at nn. 157–85.
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duty on the applicant to hide or ‘go underground’ in order to avoid detection.88 In
other words, UNHCR’s rather fungible safety standard can be interpreted as asking,
‘Is it somehow possible for the asylum seeker to avoid domestic harm?’ rather than
‘Can the individual secure access to domestic protection?’89 This approach is evident in cases that view as decisive the fact that an asylum seeker has somehow managed to avoid persecution for a short period before ﬂeeing his or her home State.
For example, in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Guang, the applicant had
incurred a ﬁne for breaching the one-child policy in China and had subsequently
displayed a poster in his village expressing the view that the government imposed
lighter penalties on well-connected people. A warrant was issued for his arrest and
he ﬂed to Shanghai where he stayed with a friend for two months before escaping
to the United Kingdom. A UK court rejected his claim for asylum on the basis that
he did not suffer persecution during the two months he hid in Shanghai.90
More generally, an emphasis on ‘safety’ alone runs a signiﬁcant risk of encouraging a view that it is incumbent upon the asylum seeker to avoid persecution in the
proposed internal destination by suppressing his or her political or religious beliefs
in order to avoid detection by the relevant authorities. There are a number of worrying examples of courts apparently taking such an approach by reference to the
safety standard, particularly in cases involving opponents of the one-child policy in
China.91 In one decision of the Australian Federal Court involving a medical practitioner who was involved in political activity directed at opposition to the one-child
policy, including frequently writing angry letters to government ofﬁcials objecting

88 For example, in Ahmed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ 718, the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal considered the claim of a Bangladeshi member of the Awami
League who had been able to avoid harm in his country for fourteen months by going into virtual hiding with a family in a distant town, working as their private cook, and rarely leaving
the home. As the Court concluded: ‘The mere fact that the appellant lived a certain time without signiﬁcant problems in Chittagong, away from his home and half in hiding, is obviously not
sufﬁcient to conclude that he could rely on state protection in his country.’
89 Indeed, UNHCR’s 1999 elaboration of this issue regrettably suggests that the relevant question
is ‘whether the risk of persecution that an individual experiences in one part of the country can be
successfully avoided by living in another part of the country’: UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above
n. 22, at para. 9 (emphasis added).
90 R. v. IAT, ex parte Guang, English High Court (QBD), Decision No. CO/3029/98, 1 Sept. 1999.
91 E.g., in R. v. IAT, ex parte Sui Rong Suen, [1997] Imm AR 355, the English High Court (QBD) upheld
the rejection (by the tribunal below) of the claim of a 16-year-old Chinese girl who ﬂed to the
UK after throwing a rock at police who were brutalizing her mother for violating the one-child
policy. She ﬁrst went to her grandmother’s home, but stayed only a few days because the police
were looking for her there. She then went to a friend’s place one-and-a-half hours away from her
village. After a week, her father advised her to leave the country, and bribed an ofﬁcial to obtain a
passport for her. The IAT, with very little analysis, found internal ﬂight to be viable because there
was no evidence that authorities had pursued her outside her province. The High Court (QBD)
afﬁrmed the decision since, ‘[o]n the ﬁndings of fact of the adjudicator it is clear that there would
be no persecution, in his view, in any part of China other than the Fujian Province’ (at p. 363).
This decision implies that the fact that she was able to avoid the authorities by hiding precluded
the recognition of refugee status.
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to the one-child policy, the Court found an internal ﬂight alternative to exist since
there was evidence that ‘the applicant had, in fact, been able to restrain herself from
expressing her opinions on the question of the one-child policy between 1992 and
1996’.92
This ‘duty of restraint’ is inconsistent with the very premise of the 1951 Convention, that is, that individuals have a right to be free of persecution for reasons of
their political beliefs (and other grounds), which presupposes a freedom to express
and act upon those political beliefs. It can never be acceptable for decision makers to
require asylum seekers to avoid persecution by denying their fundamental civil and
political rights such as freedom of expression of opinion and of association and freedom to express and practise religious beliefs.93 Given the Preamble’s afﬁrmation
that the refugee regime is premised on ‘the principle that human beings shall enjoy
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination’, refugee status may not
be refused simply because an applicant could live in safety by declining to exercise
his or her fundamental beliefs. As the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia
has recognized in a different case:
[A]n assumption that a person with a strongly held religious belief should act
reasonably, and compromise that belief to avoid persecution, would be
contrary to the humanitarian objects of the Convention.94

An approach which looks not merely to ‘safety’, but instead to the sufﬁciency of
(afﬁrmative) protection, ensures that such concerns do not arise.
Beyond its insistence on an analysis of protection rather than safety, the IPA standard also differs from UNHCR’s traditional formulation by the fact that the duty
to seek internal protection is not predicated on an assessment of whether or not
it would be ‘reasonable’ for the asylum seeker to accept internal protection. While
superﬁcially liberal, the ‘reasonableness’ test in practice allows decision makers to
assess the asylum seeker’s alternatives in light of their own view of what constitutes
‘reasonable’ behaviour. As Frelick rightly observes:
92 Ye Hong v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1998] FCA 1356, 2 Oct. 1998.
93 Indeed, it is recognized that persons at risk because they are members of ‘groups whose members
voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be
forced to forsake the association’ are entitled to refugee status on grounds of membership of a
particular social group: Ward, above n. 5, p. 739. The importance of not requiring applicants to
abdicate their religious beliefs in order to remain inside their country was recognized, for example, in a German case concerning Turkish citizens of the Yezidi religion. The Federal Constitutional Court held that there was no IPA in existence in Turkey for practising Yezidis ﬂeeing
religious persecution. By continuing to practise their religion they would be faced with severe
ﬁnancial hardship and they could not be expected to compromise their religious beliefs in order
to avail themselves of safety. See ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, p. 34.
94 Wang v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1599, at para. 85, where
Merkel J paraphrases and adopts the previous decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court
of Australia in Omar v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1430 at para.
42. Merkel J helpfully summarizes the authority for this proposition: see generally paras. 82–91.
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Reasonableness, as Alice no doubt would observe, depends on which side of
the looking glass one is standing. Viewed from the host country perspective,
the risks and dangers to asylum seekers back in their far away countries may
appear less threatening than they do from the perspective of persons who
have directly experienced those conditions up close and who fear being sent
back through the looking glass to experience them again.95

Even UNHCR’s 1999 position paper suggests only an open-ended list of possible
menu items that States may choose to consider in assessing reasonableness.96 Decision makers are thus required to make their own individual assessments as to what
is ‘reasonable’ in a particular case. Such an amorphous test is not amenable to structure or guidance by appellate courts. Storey has remarked on the situation in the
United Kingdom that, ‘despite seeing the IFA as an essential element of the 1951
Convention scheme, there has been little sign that UK judges have either welcomed
or seen the necessity for decision makers either to analyse it or apply it themselves
within a clear or settled framework of analysis’.97
This inherent lack of analytical clarity produces wide inconsistency between
jurisdictions. For example, while decisions in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom have generally held that the presence of family in the proposed
internal destination is not necessary, other decisions, particularly in jurisdictions
such as Canada, Finland, Switzerland, and New Zealand, have insisted on the relevance of family and other social networks. A similar divergence is evident in respect
of other factors comprising the ‘reasonableness’ test. For example, the Netherlands Council of State has held that the prospect of the deterioration of an asylum
seeker’s socio-economic status will not prevent an IFA from being recognized,98 the
Danish Refugee Appeals Board is unlikely to take account of socio-economic factors
in deciding whether an internal option is reasonable,99 and the Canadian Federal
Court has denied the relevance of the potential for economic prosperity in assessing
the viability of an IFA.100 On the other hand, German101 and Swiss102 courts have
95 Frelick, above n. 6, p. 23.
96 It is said that the claimant’s personal proﬁle will be important and that factors to be considered
might include but are not limited to age, sex, health, family situation and relationships, ethnic
and cultural group, political and social links and compatibility, social or other vulnerabilities,
language abilities, educational, professional, and work background, and any past persecution
suffered and its psychological effects: UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above n. 22, at para. 16.
97 H. Storey, ‘United Kingdom Case Law on “Internal Flight Alternative”’, 11(2) Immigration and
Nationality Law and Practice, 1997, p. 57 at p. 58.
98 Decision No. A-2.0273, Netherlands Council of State, 1980.
99 See ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, p. 30.
100 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division),
[1993] FCJ 630, 23 June 1993.
101 See e.g., the decision of the Bavarian Administrative Court, AN 12 K 89.39598, 30 May 1990,
and the decision of the Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, Az. 24 BZ 87.30943, 15 Nov.
1991.
102 In a decision of the Swiss Asylum Appeal Board (French-speaking division), 6 Dec. 1994, 2nd
Ch., No. 175 287, it was held that there was no IPA for the Yezidis in the entire Turkish territory
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sometimes argued for the relevance of economic or ﬁnancial hardship in assessing
the adequacy of an IFA. A similar divergence can be seen in relation to language
skills. While decision makers in New Zealand have held that an absence of relevant language skills does not rule out internal relocation, courts in Switzerland and
Canada have held that the ability to speak the language of the relocation alternative
is highly relevant. We agree with de Moffarts’ conclusion that ‘[t]he reasonableness
approach tends to an eclectic or ad hoc jurisprudence concerning claimants from
the same countries and in similar situations’.103
Indeed, application of the ‘reasonableness’ standard may even produce inconsistent results within the same jurisdiction. This is exempliﬁed in a series of cases
before the Canadian Federal Court involving consideration of the possibility of
relocation to Colombo by older Sri Lankan Tamils. On the one hand, the Court
considered internal relocation a reasonable alternative for an 82-year-old Tamil,
conﬁned to a wheelchair, impoverished and isolated from family.104 On the other,
the Court rejected the possibility of requiring relocation to Colombo for a 75-yearold Tamil woman who had no family there,105 and remanded another case because
the tribunal panel had failed to consider that the applicant was a widow in her sixties with no family support or connections in Colombo and with no knowledge of
English or Sinhalese.106 This analysis makes plain that the ‘reasonableness’ of an
IFA is essentially in the eye of the beholder.
Not only is the reasonableness standard prone to arbitrariness, but it involves
an unfocused and open-ended inquiry which is not anchored in the language or
object of the 1951 Convention. Many of the factors frequently taken into account
by decision makers in this context have more relevance to immigration law-based
humanitarian applications than to determinations under the Convention deﬁnition. For example, where applicants have a low level of education, do not speak
the dominant language of the proposed destination, and have limited employment
experience, decision makers are more likely to reject a submission that an internal relocation alternative is available to the applicant. As an Australian tribunal
held:
The applicant has lived in the Jaffna area all his life. He has never lived or
worked in Colombo (with the exception of four months before his departure
to Australia). He does not speak Sinhalese and has never had a job. He has
limited education. As an inarticulate, elderly person from the north who

103
104
105
106

where, following the emigration of a large part of their population, they no longer had a socioeconomic network.
De Moffarts, above n. 30.
Periyathamby v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal Court (Trial
Division), (1995) 26 Imm LR (2d) 179.
Ramanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal Court (Trial
Division), Decision No. IMM-5091-97 (1998); 1998 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 1017.
Jayabalasingham v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal Court (Trial
Division), Decision No. IMM-140-98 (1998); 1998 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 1283.
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speaks no Sinhalese, the applicant would be particularly vulnerable . . . I am
satisﬁed that it would not be reasonable to require him to relocate to
Colombo where there are continuing large-scale round-ups of Tamils,
arbitrary detention of Tamils, and continuing human rights abuses on the
part of the [Sri Lankan security forces].107

The difﬁculty with such cases is that decision makers do not explain why educated, employable people are less at risk of suffering from ‘continuing large-scale
round-ups of Tamils, arbitrary detention of Tamils, and continuing human rights
abuses’ than uneducated claimants. These cases tend to conﬂate the considerations
relevant to refugee status with those more relevant to an application for entry on
humanitarian or compassionate grounds. Indeed, the humanitarian nature of the
inquiry has been explicitly acknowledged by some adjudicators.108 Yet it is difﬁcult
to understand why an extra-legal discretion, by application of the humanitarianbased reasonableness test, should reside in decision makers in respect of only this
aspect of the 1951 Convention. If it is justiﬁed in this context, then one might wonder why it is not equally justiﬁed in respect of other aspects of the deﬁnition. For example, where serious harm in respect of which a person is at risk does not amount
to ‘persecution’, why should decision makers not consider whether it is nonetheless unreasonable to expect the applicant to endure it on return to his or her home
country?
This objection is not merely a theoretical one; rather, it is this very lack of justiﬁcation for the reasonableness test in the Convention text that makes it an unwieldy
basis upon which to anchor the assessment of an internal alternative to asylum. This
point is well exempliﬁed in the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Butler v. Attorney-General:
[T]he various references to and tests for ‘reasonableness’ or ‘undue
harshness’ . . . must be seen in context or, to borrow [the English Court of
Appeal’s] metaphor, ‘against the backcloth that the issue is whether the
claimant is entitled to the status of refugee’. It is not a stand alone test,
authorising an unconﬁned inquiry into all the social, economic and political
circumstances of the application including the circumstances of members of
the family . . .
Rather than being seen as free standing . . . the reasonableness test must be
related to the primary obligation of the country of nationality to protect the
claimant . . . The reasonableness element must be tied back to the deﬁnition
107 Decision No. V96/05239, Australian RRT, 11 March 1997.
108 For example, in Jayabalasingham, above n. 106, Richard J held that, when the tribunal had stated
that the reasonableness of the IPA requires ‘some additional or extraordinary hardship’, it had
erred by bringing the threshold of the test beyond humanitarian and compassionate considerations. See also Ramanathan, above n. 105, in which Hugessen J held that it is incorrect to exclude humanitarian and compassionate grounds when considering the possibility of internal
protection.
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of ‘refugee’ set out in the Convention and to the Convention’s purposes of
original protection or surrogate protection for the avoidance of
persecution.109

The risk of continuing to insist on this approach therefore is that any careful interpreter of the 1951 Convention will eventually be drawn to the position articulated by the UK Immigration Appeals Tribunal in Ashokanathan that
‘reasonableness’ is simply a kind of ‘humanitarian gloss’ on strictly legal treaty
obligations.110 Indeed, Canadian courts now set ‘a very high threshold for the unreasonableness test’.111 By contrast, an analysis focused on the sufﬁciency of protection has the distinct advantage of being a standard actually derived from a treaty
that States have formally agreed to be binding on them. In addition, it provides a
focused and principled framework of analysis, based on the aims and objects of the
1951 Convention.

V.

Steps for assessment of an internal protection alternative

In order to determine whether a claim to refugee status may lawfully be
denied on grounds of an internal protection alternative (IPA), four criteria must be
considered. First, is the proposed IPA accessible to the individual – meaning access
that is practical, safe, and legal? Secondly, does the IPA offer an ‘antidote’ to the wellfounded fear of being persecuted shown to exist in the applicant’s place of origin –
that is, does it present less than a ‘real chance’ or ‘serious possibility’ of the original risk? Thirdly, is it clear that there are no new risks of being persecuted in the
IPA, or of direct or indirect refoulement back to the place of origin? And, fourthly,
is at least the minimum standard of afﬁrmative State protection available in the
proposed IPA?
In this section, we outline the considerations relevant to the application of each
of these four analytical steps. As we hope to make clear, far from being a radical
departure from prior practice, the IPA approach merely draws together the ‘best
109 Butler v. Attorney-General, above n. 71, p. 218.
110 Ashokanathan, Decision No. 13294, UK IAT. According to C. Yeo, ‘The “Internal Flight Alternative”: Counter-Arguments’, 15(1) Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 2001, p. 9 at p. 16:
Looking to the future, the approach to an internal protection alternative advocated in
the Michigan Guidelines on IPA and adopted in New Zealand seems preferable to the
current UK position. Uncertainty would also be reduced and the approach is more
readily compatible with the text of the Convention. It might also lead to a higher
success rate in asylum applications. While the Michigan approach may appear to restrict
positive discretion, Adjudicators might prove to be more amenable to accepting IFA
counter-arguments if such arguments were more ﬁrmly based on a logical foundation.
111 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ranganathan, Canadian Federal Court of
Appeal, Decision No. A-348-99, 21 Dec. 2000.
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practice’ of State Parties in a legal framework directly derived from the 1951 Convention itself. For this reason, the IPA approach is neither inherently more liberal
nor more conservative than earlier formulations; it is simply a framework explicitly designed to identify persons who do not require the surrogate protection at the
heart of refugee law because they already have access to the protection of their own
State.

A.

Step 1: accessibility

Since IPA analysis is concerned with the possibility of a present source of
alternative internal protection, the ﬁrst question is whether the asylum seeker can
in fact gain access to the region proposed as an IPA. This notion that the IPA must
not be ‘merely theoretical or abstract’112 is already a well-accepted proposition in
the jurisprudence of States Parties:113
[N]otwithstanding that real protection from persecution may be available
elsewhere within the country of nationality . . . [IPA does not apply] if, as a
practical matter, the part of the country in which protection is available is not
reasonably accessible to that person. In the context of refugee law, the
practical realities facing a person who claims to be a refugee must be carefully
considered.114

Closely related to the question of practical accessibility is the duty to assess the
physical risks entailed in the process of travel to or entry into the IPA. This has also
been well recognized in State practice.115 For example, in Dirshe v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), the Canadian Federal Court emphasized this concern
in a case where travel to the proposed IPA involved passage through an area in which
violent gangs and roving militia were present:
112 Decision No. N94/03786, Australian RRT, 1995.
113 For example, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Etugh, above n. 14, that there
was an IPA for the Nigerian claimant because the deportation procedure could be effected without the applicant having to re-enter his hometown (where a clear risk existed). Applying the
converse proposition, the UK IAT in Baglan (Decision No. 12620) granted the appeal of a Turkish
Kurd on the grounds that the Home Ofﬁce proposed to deport him not to the identiﬁed ‘safe
enclave’, but rather to Istanbul (where he was found to face the risk of persecution). As Linden
J stated in Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada, above n. 25, p. 598, ‘[a]n IFA cannot be speculative or
theoretical only; it must be a realistic, attainable option’.
114 Randhawa, above n. 14, p. 270. The principle has more recently been reiterated by the Full Court
of the Federal Court of Australia in Perampalam v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(1999) 84 FCR 274, at 288 per Moore J.
115 The US BIA held in Matter of H. (BIA, Decision No. 3276, 1996) that it would be prepared to give
weight to the government’s contention that an internal protected area existed for the Somali
claimant only if ﬁrst provided with clariﬁcation of just how the government would propose to
deport the individual to the protected area (in view of the dangers between Mogadishu – where
access was possible – and the allegedly safe area).
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The Tribunal erred in law in its assessment of the applicant’s fear of gangs
and roving militia in relation to the [IPA]. In order for an [IPA] to be viable, it
must be physically possible for the applicant to get there. This involves an
assessment of how the applicant is to get there. If it is dangerous for the
applicant to get to the safe area, it cannot be said that the [IPA] is a practical
possibility.116

The ﬁnal aspect – legal accessibility – has two dimensions. First, it is imperative that an asylum seeker not be returned to an IPA where return requires passage
through an intermediate State which will not legally permit the asylum seeker’s
entry. For example, a Kurd could not be returned to northern Iraq via Turkey if
Turkey will not grant a visa to permit entry into Turkey. This was emphasized by
the Federal Court of Australia in Al-Amidi v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs:
The Tribunal was satisﬁed that the applicant could not enter Iran or Syria and
was likely to be satisﬁed on the evidence before it that he could not enter
Turkey. There was nothing before the Tribunal to allow it to be satisﬁed that
the applicant would be given travel documents, and, if returned from
Australia, that he would be able to enter northern Iraq. Indeed, the Tribunal
did not consider that question. That represented a fundamental ﬂaw in the
decision-making process and one which meant that the task set for the
Tribunal by the Act was not carried out.117

Secondly, since the rationale of internal alternative protection is that refugee status is not required to be granted where the applicant’s own government is able to
protect him or her in at least part of the country of origin, it would make little sense
to deny asylum on the basis of an internal option that the national government has
formally made unavailable to the applicant.118 As was well explained by the Canadian Federal Court in Sathananthan v. Canada, in refusing to recognize the existence
of an IPA for a Tamil in Sri Lanka:
[T]he applicant’s evidence was that he was ordered by the police in Colombo
to go North within 48 hours – a place where . . . the applicant had a
116 Dirshe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division),
Decision No. IMM-2124-96 (1997), 1997 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 521.
117 Al-Amidi v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, above n. 71, pp. 510–11. See also, the
decision of the Bavarian Higher Administrative Court, which held that a Kurdish asylum seeker
could not be expected to return to northern Iraq as he did not possess any valid travel documents, without which he would be unable to access the territory of northern Iraq via Syria,
Turkey, or Iran and there would be no other legal way of entering northern Iraq, Decision
No. 23 B 99.32990, 23 March 2000, cited in ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, p. 35.
118 For example, the UK IAT correctly held in Yang (Decision No. 13952, 1996) that no relocation
alternative existed for the Chinese applicant in that case, since ‘[o]n the background evidence
available to us it seems that China administratively controls where its citizens may live and
there is therefore no freedom of internal movement without consent’.
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well-founded fear of persecution . . . [The] ﬁnding [of internal protection] is
grounded in faulty analysis . . . based . . . [inter alia] on a contradiction (one can
stay in Colombo but if one does one will be breaking the law and will be
arrested).119

Once practical, safe, and legal accessibility to the proposed IPA has been established, the inquiry turns to an assessment of the quality of protection available
in the IPA. This in turn involves a threefold analysis: does the IPA constitute an
‘antidote’ to the original risk of being persecuted; are there new risks of being persecuted, or of refoulement to the region of origin; and is the level of afﬁrmative protection available in the IPA consistent with the minimum acceptable standard?

B.

Step 2: antidote

An IPA can obviously be said to exist only in a place where the applicant
does not face a well founded fear of being persecuted. It is not, however, sufﬁcient simply to ﬁnd that the original agent of persecution has not yet established
a presence in the proposed site of internal protection. Rather, there must be reason to believe that the reach of the agent of persecution is likely to remain localized
outside the designated place of internal protection. For example, a German court
found that a Lebanese asylum seeker could not avail himself of an IPA as Syrian
troops, who perceived the applicant to be an opponent of the Baath party in power
in Syria, were in the process of expanding their already extensive control over a large
part of Lebanon. The Court thus held that ‘it was . . . not certain that the applicant
would be safe from persecution by the Syrian military for a considerable period of
time’.120
The method of measuring the degree of risk in the IPA is the usual ‘well-founded
fear’ test, that is, whether there is a ‘reasonable possibility’, ‘reasonable chance’, or
‘real chance’ of being persecuted in the IPA. On the one hand, a fear of being persecuted is well founded even if there is not a clear probability that the individual will
be persecuted. On the other hand, the mere chance or remote possibility of being
persecuted is an insufﬁcient basis for the recognition of refugee status. The relevant
inquiry is whether there is a signiﬁcant risk that the individual may be persecuted
in the IPA in the foreseeable future.
Clearly, an inquiry into the potential for an IPA to provide an antidote to the persecution feared in the localized region presupposes an initial assessment of the nature and degree of the well-founded fear in the applicant’s region of origin. This
is because the antidote required will vary considerably according to the risk of
119 Sathananthan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada (Trial
Division), Decision No. IMM-5152-98 (1999); 1999 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 1149.
120 Higher Administrative Court (Hessen), Decision No. UE 1568/84, 2 May 1990.
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persecution faced in the ﬁrst region. Thus, protection that is meaningful and effective in one case may not be so in another. For example, while a man who fears
guerrillas requires protection from a strong government military that can conﬁne
the threat to localized regions, a strong military that can suppress guerrilla activity
may be meaningless for a woman ﬂeeing domestic violence who needs assertive police protection. This again serves to highlight the importance of approaching the inquiry in a methodical manner, beginning with an assessment of well-founded fear
before proceeding to the protection assessment. An analysis that conceives of IPA
as part of the initial well-founded fear assessment obscures the importance of this
two-stage assessment and runs the risk of producing an inadequate assessment of
continuing risk in the intended IPA.
In practical terms, a decision regarding the existence of an IPA is a function of (a)
the ability of the agent of persecution to be present in the IPA;121 and (b) the likelihood of pursuit in the IPA. A Canadian decision illustrates the interplay of these
two essential elements in the inquiry:
[In rejecting the claimant’s application, the Immigration and Refugee Board]
failed to address the applicant’s evidence that the applicant’s husband is a
sophisticated, vindictive and obsessed individual and that, based on his past
conduct, he would be able to track down the applicant anywhere in Peru,
even without his political connections [to the Shining Path].
Inter alia, the Board suggested that a reasonable [IPA] existed outside Lima,
as the applicant could ﬁnd employment as a teacher. However, it did not deal
with the submission that the applicant’s husband could trace her through the
Ministry of Education. Further, despite ﬁnding state protection had been
refused in the past, the Board offered no substantive reason to justify that the
applicant would be safe outside Lima.122

In this decision, the Court appropriately considered the fact that the husband
was sophisticated and well connected in the government and the Shining Path (that
is, capable of pursuit) and that he was obsessed (that is, likely to pursue).
The frequent concern of courts with whether the asylum seeker is a prominent activist or relatively anonymous should similarly be understood to inform the issue
121 E.g., the Federal Court of Canada found that an Argentinian claimant opposed to mandatory
union dues and a member of the Radical Civic Union party (UCR), faced the risk of beatings
by trade unionists. But the court found a valid IPA because ‘there are municipal and provincial jurisdictions controlled by political opponents of the Justicialista (Peronist) Party and its
trade union allies . . . [T]he claimant could live safely in provinces of Argentina controlled by
the UCR’: Vidal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada (Trial
Division), Decision No. A-644-92 (1997); Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 408. Similarly, in New Zealand
RSAA, Decision No. 1613/93, the tribunal found that a low caste Indian could ﬁnd internal
protection ‘by relocating either to Uttar Pradesh or Bihar [where] the appellant would be able
to take advantage of the lower caste governments there in power’.
122 Gonzales-Cambana v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada
(Trial Division), Decision No. IMM-933-96 (1997); 1997 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 689.
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of the likelihood of pursuit by the agent of persecution into the proposed IPA.123
However, as emphasized above, it is vital that adjudicators be careful to avoid transforming this analysis into a duty on behalf of claimants to become anonymous by
suppressing their political or religious views or by hiding from the agents of persecution in the new site.124 As the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal held in a case
rejecting the possibility of an IPA for a person at risk because of strong religious
convictions, ‘[t]he issue of internal ﬂight is not a signiﬁcant one when one takes the
approach of considering the likely conduct of the applicant upon return, for one
may expect that this conduct would be the same whatever part of the country he
returned to’.125
Perhaps the most important and controversial issue that arises under this element of the IPA analytical framework is whether there can ever be an effective
antidote inside the applicant’s country of origin where the agent of persecution
is the government itself. In short, is the very idea of an IPA in the face of a risk
of being directly persecuted by the government logically inconsistent, given that
the 1951 Convention conceives of the national government as the source of legally
relevant protection (‘. . . unable or . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country . . .’)? Comparative jurisprudence reveals divergent answers to this
question.
At one extreme, some decision makers have taken the view that whether or not
the persecutor is the State is completely irrelevant to the analysis.126 However, these
123 For example, the Administrative Court of Austria found that well-known Kurdish opposition
ﬁgures in Iraq could not ﬁnd protection in the ‘safe’ Kurdish zone because ‘Kurdish authorities in the autonomous safety zone are not in a situation to protect the applicant from danger
of persecution by Iraqi authorities. The evidence presented showing general instability lets us
believe that, absent concrete proof to the contrary, it would not be improbable that the Iraqi secret police could undertake activities directed against known opposition ﬁghters in the safety
zone of Northern Iraq, without effective hindrance from the Kurdish authorities. Therefore
there is no [IPA] available for the applicant’: Decision No. 95/20/0284, 12 Sept. 1996 (unofﬁcial
translation).
124 See the text above at nn. 88–90. For example, in In Re C.A.L., above n. 33, the US BIA inappropriately relied on a lack of notoriety to reject a Guatemalan man’s asylum claim on the basis of
an IPA, ﬁnding (inter alia) that ‘[w]e do not consider the respondent to be a high proﬁle victim
of harassment by the guerrillas’ (p. 5). This was signiﬁcant given that:
[t]he Department of State country conditions report on Guatemala states that the
numbers of guerrillas have declined through the years, the guerrillas are concentrated
in remote areas with large Indian populations not easily accessible to government
control, and the threat to the general population has decreased.
Ibid., p. 5.
125 Decision No. V96/04931, Australian RRT, 25 Nov. 1996.
126 For example, in Matter of R., above n. 33, the US BIA held that:
[a]ssuming, arguendo, that he previously suffered persecution in Punjab, on the
evidence of the record before us, we do not ﬁnd it unreasonable to expect him to have
sought refuge elsewhere in India. In view of the unrebutted opinion of the Department
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decisions tend to be problematic, as they often ignore the superior capacity of the
State to pursue the applicant into alternative regions or impose an effective obligation on the applicant to hide from the State in an alternative location.
At the other extreme, some courts have taken the view that if the agent of persecution is the government an IPA can never exist.127 This approach has the advantage of ensuring that the beneﬁt of any doubt regarding the government’s potential
for continued persecution in the alternative region is resolved in favour of the asylum seeker. In addition, it is consistent with the general position in international
human rights law.128 However, it may also be too simplistic, as it fails to consider
the different types of government entities and their varying capacity for nationwide
persecution.
We recommend a middle ground approach which takes into account the differences between levels of government, as well as divergences in the degree of governmental implication in the risk of being persecuted. The most straightforward type
of case, where the application of an IPA test is most obviously appropriate, is one in
which the State is not the agent or sponsor of the persecution, but is simply unable
to respond to the risk posed by non-State agents in a particular region. In such cases
there is no reason to assume that the government cannot be trusted elsewhere in the
country. Thus, these cases should be analyzed as standard IPA claims, without any
particular presumption as to outcome. Decision makers should nonetheless carefully consider all relevant factors, including whether the State is truly willing but
unable to provide protection in the applicant’s home region, whether the persecuting group’s activities (or the government’s inability to control the group’s activities)
are truly limited to one region, and whether in the IPA the government effectively
protects similarly situated persons.
On the other hand, the least logical situation in which to ﬁnd an IPA is where the
agent of persecution is the national government itself. Where, for example, harm is
threatened by the police or military of a country, or where the national government
of State . . . we ﬁnd that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that conditions in
India, outside Punjab, are not such that the applicant would have a well-founded fear of
returning to that country.
127 In decisions involving Tamils from Sri Lanka and Kurds from Turkey, the Netherlands Council
of State has refused even to consider internal relocation, holding in effect that internal relocation is excluded if the national authorities are the agent of persecution (A.R.R. v. S. (1982); R.V.
(1982); A.R.R. v. S. (1988) and R.V. (1994)). The Swiss Asylum Appeal Board (French-speaking division), 21 April 1993, 4th Ch., No. 138 356, has held that there is no possibility of internal protection where the asylum seeker is directly persecuted by the central authorities. In that case the
Board recognized the claim to asylum of a member of the Turkish Communist Party/MarxistLeninist who had been labelled an ‘undesirable person’ by the Turkish authorities.
128 For example, in Alan v. Switzerland, UN Doc. CAT/C/16/D/21/1995, 8 May 1996, the Committee Against Torture addressed the claim of a rejected Kurdish asylum seeker from Turkey. The
Committee, concerned that the agent of persecution was the Turkish State itself, found that
there was no safe area for the applicant inside Turkey.
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actively sponsors or supports the persecutory activities of a theoretically independent agent, there should be a strong presumption against ﬁnding an IPA.129 Indeed, the presumption against IPA in such circumstances may logically be deﬁned
as verging on irrefutable.130 This is consistent with the view of UNHCR that, ‘in the
overwhelming majority of cases involving a fear of State agents of persecution, the
availability of a safe internal alternative will not be a relevant consideration’.131 A
national government presumably has the capacity to pursue anywhere within its jurisdiction. When the State has itself threatened a person in his or her home region,
even a small chance that the government will pursue the person logically amounts
to a genuine risk of harm.132 As explained by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Singh v. Moschorak:
All that is required for refugee status to be recognized is a ‘real chance’, a
‘serious possibility’ of persecution. Even if the national government
presently sees no reason to persecute a particular group in a particular place,
it has already demonstrated its willingness to persecute elsewhere. Surely
this alone – unless there has been a fundamental change of government – is
129 Recently promulgated US regulations establish a presumption that internal relocation is not
reasonable where the persecutor is a government or is government-sponsored, unless the INS
‘establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that, under all the circumstances, it would be
reasonable for the applicant to relocate’ (US Regulations, above n. 3).
130 For example, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that ‘it has never been
thought that there are safe places within a nation when it is the nation’s government that has
engaged in the acts of punishing opinion that have driven the victim to leave the country’: Singh
v. Moschorak, 53 F 3d 1031 at 1034 (9th Circuit), 1995; Chanchavac v. INS, 2000 US App. Lexis
5066 (9th Circuit), 27 March 2000.
131 UNHCR, ‘1999 Position Paper’, above n. 22, pp. 1–3.
132 This approach has also been taken by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting
Art. 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ETS No. 5. In Chahal v. United Kingdom (Decision No. 70/1995/576/662, 1996), the
Court was concerned with an application for asylum in the UK of a Sikh separatist, who alleged
persecution in the Punjab region of India. The UK offered to send him to another part of India,
claiming that only the local Punjabi police posed a real risk, which had lessened in recent years
in any event. Chahal introduced evidence that Sikh separatists are at risk of disappearance, arrest, extrajudicial execution, and torture anywhere in India. The Court essentially accepted
Chahal’s evidence and rejected the possibility of an IPA:
Although the Court is of the opinion that Mr Chahal, if returned to India, would be
most at risk from the Punjab security forces acting either within or outside State
boundaries, it also attaches signiﬁcance to the fact that attested allegations of serious
human rights violations have been levelled at the police elsewhere in India.
Ibid., para. 104.
In a more recent decision, the European Court of Human Rights in Hilal v. United Kingdom,
Decision No. 45276/99, 6 March 2001, rejected the UK Government’s argument that an ‘internal ﬂight’ option existed in mainland Tanzania for an applicant ﬂeeing persecution in Zanzibar. The Court explained that ‘[t]he police in mainland Tanzania may be regarded as linked
institutionally to the police in Zanzibar as part of the Union and cannot be relied on as a safeguard against arbitrary action’ (at para. 67).
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enough to meet the ‘real chance’, ‘serious possibility’ standard throughout
the country over which that government has authority.133

The logic of avoiding consideration of IPA when an ofﬁcial organ of the national
State is the direct or indirect agent of persecution is well illustrated in the recent
decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Jang, a case in which internal protection was assessed in relation to
a Christian woman fearing persecution on religious grounds in China as a result of
the enforcement of a national law restricting religious practices. One of the issues
to be considered by the Court was whether the tribunal below had erred in failing to
consider the IPA option since the enforcement of the national law varied between
regions. The Court rejected the notion that the possibility of internal protection
was an appropriate consideration in such a case:
However, where the feared persecution arises out of action taken by
government ofﬁcials to enforce the law of the country of nationality, or to
implement a policy adopted by the government of that country, it will be
much more difﬁcult for [a] . . . decision maker to reach satisfaction that there
is no real risk of the refugee applicant being persecuted if returned to that
country. In such a case, if there is a safe area, this must be because the
responsible ofﬁcials have failed to discharge their duty to enforce the relevant
law or policy . . . That situation might change overnight, either because of the
appointment of one or more new ofﬁcials or insistence on enforcement by
superior ofﬁces. There will often (perhaps usually) be a ‘real risk’ of that
happening.134

It should be emphasized that this extreme caution against considering IPA applies both in cases where the national government is the direct persecutor and
where the national government is the sponsor of persecution by other State or nonState agents. As has usually been recognized, this is because there is no greater reason to entrust an applicant’s protection to a government which persecutes indirectly than to one which persecutes directly.
When might it be possible to rebut the extremely strong presumption against IPA
where the national government is the direct or indirect agent of persecution? The
assertion that a person can be safe in an alternative region of the country when the
national government is the agent or sponsor of persecution, absent the imposition
133 Singh v. Moschorak, above n. 130. See also, Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F 2d 1332 at 1336 (9th Circuit),
1986, where the Court said, in relation to the contention that the Nicaraguan government persecuted Miskito Indians only on the Atlantic Coast:
[T]he record does not indicate any clear intent on the part of the Sandinistas to limit
their persecution to any one geographical area, and Damaize testiﬁed that he can be
readily identiﬁed as a Miskito wherever he goes.
134 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Jang, (2000) 175 ALR 752 at 758–9.
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of a requirement that the person hide from the government, essentially presumes
that relocation will fundamentally alter the person’s relationship with the national
government. This suggests an analogy to the Convention’s cessation clause that allows refugee status to be withdrawn when ‘the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist’.135 The test of
whether a change of circumstances has taken place is an onerous one: the change
must be proven to be substantial, truly effective, and durable.136 A comparably high
burden should rest on the asylum State seeking to establish that a person who faces
the risk of being persecuted by a national government can be said to be protected
by that same government in the proposed IPA.137 In particular, once the national
government has displayed an interest in persecuting an individual, it cannot be assumed that periods of non-persecution, even in a different location, are sufﬁcient
evidence that the government no longer intends to harm the applicant. This was
recognized by a New Zealand tribunal in a case concerning a claim by a member of
the All India Sikh Student Federation who had been tortured by Indian police:
It is common in such cases for police activity to be unpredictable and
spasmodic, though their interest remains constant. It is a common feature of
cases heard by the Authority that police will visit at irregular intervals. On
occasion those intervals are closely spaced, on other occasions they are widely
spaced. For that reason care must be taken to ensure that inferences are
drawn not only from the regularity of the visits, but also from the equally
fundamental factor, namely the suspicions held by the police.138

There are, however, two ‘intermediate categories’ in which it is appropriate to
apply a presumption against IPA, but not a nearly insurmountable presumption of
the kind beﬁtting situations of direct or indirect national government persecution.
The ﬁrst intermediate category consists of cases where the threat is one that emanates from local governmental authorities. Because local governments operate
under the authority of the national government, an IPA should be found to exist
135 1951 Convention, Art. 1C(5).
136 UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII) 1992, opines that the change in circumstances must be ‘fundamental, stable and durable’.
137 US courts have generally recognized that the burden rests on the party seeking to rebut the
presumption in cases involving State persecution. In a case involving a Coptic Christian from
the Sudan whose family had been terrorized by government forces on religious grounds, the
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held that:
[w]hen a party seeking asylum demonstrates that a national government is the
‘persecutor’, the burden should fall upon the INS to show that this government’s
persecutive actions are truly limited to a clearly delineated and limited locality and
situation, so that the applicant for asylum therefore need not fear a likelihood of
persecution elsewhere in the nation.
Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F 3d 579 at 587 (5th Circuit), 1996.
138 Re R.S., New Zealand RSAA, above n. 84.
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only very rarely in such a case. In principle, a national government that fails to intervene to prevent persecution by local authorities is highly unlikely to be a solid
guardian of those who were victimized in that locality. Only if there is clear evidence that the persecuting authority has no sway outside its own region and that
there were particularly extenuating circumstances to explain the national government’s failure to counteract localized harms in the region of origin (of a kind not
relevant to the proposed IPA) might it be possible to consider an IPA in such circumstances. A case in which the presumption may have been properly rebutted (but was
not in fact considered) is Rakesh Maini, a recent decision of the US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.139 The decision involved the claim of a mixed Sikh-Hindu
couple who were attacked by local Marxist party (CPM) operatives in Calcutta. As
the CPM has no power in most other parts of India, the Court might reasonably
have inquired into the possibility of internal protection.
On the whole, however, courts have properly taken a cautious approach to allegations that persecution is localized because the relevant action is by local authorities.
For example, in Mirza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a Pakistani
man applied for asylum in Canada because he feared persecution by local police
based on his political activities. The police had raided a political meeting he had
organized, and a local court issued an arrest warrant for him. The tribunal denied
refugee status on internal protection grounds, ﬁnding that ‘even if the arrest warrants were indeed valid, the panel, in light of the current country conditions, ﬁnds
that the arrest warrants would not be acted upon’. The Federal Court overturned
this ﬁnding, emphasizing that the arrest warrants could be executed anywhere in
Pakistan, even if issued only by a local court.140
The second ‘intermediate’ category for which IPA may be relevant comprises
cases where the national government has not supported the non-State agent of
harm, but has simply tolerated its actions. While also operating under a presumption against the existence of an IPA, such cases may be more open to a rebuttal of
the presumption since the conditions forming the basis of the government’s decision to tolerate persecution in one region may not pertain to other regions of the
country. For example, the extent of ethnic tension in a particular region may be
so high that government intervention to protect an oppressed minority from vigilante thugs could legitimately be said to pose the risk of exacerbating widespread
violence. In such circumstances, a government may decide that it has no practical
option but to tolerate the abuse of a minority by non-State actors in a particular
region at a particular moment. It may, however, be willing and able to protect that
same minority in a different region in the country. Nonetheless, the instance of tolerance of privately inﬂicted persecution requires a careful inquiry as to the reasons
139 Rakesh Maini v. INS, 212 F 3d 1167 (9th Circuit), 2000.
140 Canadian Federal Court Trial Division, Decision No. IMM-4618-98 (1999); 1999 Fed. Ct. Trial
Lexis 842.
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for the government’s actions, and suggests that caution should be exercised before
ﬁnding the presumption rebutted.

C.

Step 3: no new risk of being persecuted, or of refoulement, to the
region of origin

The third step in IPA analysis is to ensure that, by returning a person to an
alternative region of their country of origin, the returning State is not simply substituting one predicament for another. The proposed IPA would clearly not offer
protection if the risk of one form of persecution were obviated only to be replaced
by a different risk of persecution for a Convention reason in the IPA. What of the situation, however, where there exists a risk of even generalized war or other violence
in the proposed IPA (thus not qualifying an individual originating in the IPA to
refugee status because there is no nexus to one of the ﬁve Convention grounds)?
Or what if the only potential IPA were located in an uninhabitable desert (again,
not sufﬁcient to qualify an individual originating in the IPA to refugee status, as
generalized hardship would not ordinarily amount to a risk of ‘being persecuted’)?
Should an IPA be held to exist in either of these situations?
Jurisprudence in most States Parties suggests that, where the asylum seeker
would confront either generalized harm within the realm of persecution or other
forms of serious adversity, the existence of an IPA may be denied on the grounds of
‘unreasonableness’.141 As recently explained by Brooke LJ in Karanakaran:
In theory it might be possible for someone to return to a desert region of his
former country, populated only by camels and nomads, but the rigidity of the
words ‘is unable to avail himself of the protection of that country’ has been
tempered by a small amount of humanity. In the leading case of Ex p. Robinson
this court followed an earlier decision of the Federal Court of Canada and
suggested that a person should be regarded as unable to avail himself of the
protection of his home country if it would be unduly harsh to expect him to
live there.142
141 See, e.g., the recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Perampalam v.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, above n. 114, in which the Court noted that:
It cannot be reasonable to expect a refugee to avoid persecution by moving into an area
of grave danger, whether that danger arises from a natural disaster (for example, a
volcanic eruption), a civil war or some other cause. A well-founded fear of persecution
for a Convention reason having been shown, a refugee does not also have to show a
Convention reason behind every difﬁculty or danger which makes some suggestion of
relocation unreasonable.
Ibid., p. 284 per Burchett and Lee JJ.
142 See above n. 31, p. 456. See also, Randhawa v. Minister of Immigration, above n. 14; R. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department and another, ex parte Robinson, English Court of Appeal, 11 July 1997,
[1997] 4 All ER 210; Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n. 71.

Internal protection/relocation/ﬂight alternative

401

However, as described in some detail in Section IV above,143 the risks of continuing to insist upon a consideration of these factors within the rubric of a ‘reasonableness’ inquiry are signiﬁcant, including both inconsistency between and even within
jurisdictions, and most importantly the imposition of a decision maker’s perspective on appropriate behaviour in analyzing circumstances likely to be beyond his
or her personal experience. As explained above, the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry is
also extremely vulnerable to challenge or outright abrogation, since it appears
to grant decision makers the right to engage in an open-ended humanitarian assessment of a kind not called for by the 1951 Convention itself.144 Rather than
relying upon a vague term not found in the text of the 1951 Convention, the
protection approach to IPA analysis requires that potential risks of a kind not capable of grounding an independent claim to refugee status be taken into account in
ways that can more readily be accommodated within the 1951 Convention framework. This tack is not only more legally justiﬁed than the asserted duty to assess
‘reasonableness’, but as a pragmatic matter is more likely to be accepted by those
adjudicators sceptical of the viability and justiﬁcation of the amorphous reasonableness test. The relevance of generalized or non-persecutory serious harm in the
IPA can be taken into account within the terms of the 1951 Convention in two
ways.
First, it may be the case that the harm faced in the proposed IPA is sufﬁciently serious to fall within the realm of ‘persecution’, but nonetheless an insufﬁcient basis
for a refugee claim because it is truly generalized in its inﬂiction or impact (that is,
there is no nexus to one of the ﬁve Convention grounds). This might be the case if
an applicant were exposed in the IPA to generalized threats to life or physical security associated with war, or to generalized extreme economic deprivation on a
variety of fronts (for example, lack of food, shelter, or basic health care). While persons originating in the proposed IPA would fail the test for refugee status on nexus
grounds, the same cannot be said of the person whose case is being considered on
IPA grounds. The latter person did not face these (persecutory) risks in his or her
place of origin, and has already been found to face a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason in his or her home area. The only reason – albeit an
indirect reason – that she or he now faces the prospect of a threat to life or physical security in the proposed IPA is therefore the ﬂight from the place of origin on
Convention grounds which has led him or her (via the asylum State) now to be confronted with a harm within the scope of persecution. The risk now faced is therefore a risk faced ‘for reasons of’ the Convention ground which initiated the original
involuntary movement from the home region. This is because the nexus criterion
in the refugee deﬁnition requires only a causal relationship between a protected
factor (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, membership of a particular
social group) and the persecutory risk. If the protected ground is a contributing
143 See the text above at nn. 95 et seq.

144 See the text above at nn. 108–10.
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factor to the risk of being persecuted, then Convention status is appropriately
recognized.145
This is the position impliedly accepted in the German approach to IPA analysis.
For example, the German Federal Administrative Court has explained:
[A]n alternative is not possible where the applicant would face threats
elsewhere in his country of origin that are equivalent in intensity to those
which initially led him to ﬂee. Such threats need not be of a political nature;
so long as the applicant would be forced into a precarious position to avoid . . .
persecution . . . in his region of origin, the applicant effectively has no access
to an internal [protection] alternative.146

The alternative scenario presently addressed by ‘reasonableness’ analysis involves a risk in the IPA which is not sufﬁciently egregious to amount to a risk of
‘being persecuted’. An independent refugee claim by a person originating in the
IPA would therefore not, even if able to satisfy the nexus requirement, meet the
deﬁnition of a Convention refugee. Yet serious harms falling short of persecutory
conduct may nonetheless be relevant to the assessment of IPA. This is because a person under consideration for IPA has already prima facie satisﬁed the ‘well-founded
fear of being persecuted’ (inclusory) language of the 1951 Convention. The decision
maker is now engaged in what amounts to an inquiry into exclusion from refugee
status on the grounds that the applicant (like a person with an actual or de facto second nationality) does not in fact require surrogate international protection. In a
fundamental sense, the question is whether the IPA can amount to an adequate substitute for the refugee status otherwise warranted in the asylum country. Critically,
this inquiry is predicated on the fact that the person being considered for IPA has
already been found to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
Because the IPA analysis amounts to an effort to identify a suitable in-country
solution for a person known to face the risk of persecution in that same country, the decision maker is logically expected to engage in the same sort of analysis
which would inform comparable exclusion inquiries. In the case of an individual
145 See J. C. Hathaway, ‘The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground’, 23(2) Michigan Journal of International Law, 2002, p. 207 and available on http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/
Refugee/guidelines2001.htm. Storey, above n. 35, p. 527, has argued for a similar approach
(albeit in the context of the reasonableness approach):
To say that a risk of persecution in an IFA can be indirect entails recognising that, while
the level of risk in one or more IFAs must be shown to be uniformly intense, the
continuing directness of the cause of risk for a Convention reason need not. All that
matters is that there continue to exist a serious possibility that conditions in the IFA
would either re-expose the claimant to direct risk, cause the claimant to accept, or be
forced to accept, undue hardship, or lead to a person becoming a victim of a violation of
core fundamental human rights.
146 German Federal Administrative Court Decision No. BverwG C 45.92, 14 Dec. 1993 (unofﬁcial
translation).
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possessed of actual or de facto nationality in a third State – the best comparator
for the IPA analysis – account would clearly need to be taken of the duty of nonrefoulement. That is, an asylum State would be prohibited from denying refugee status on grounds of actual or de facto third (safe) State nationality if there were reason
to believe that the conditions in the third State – while not themselves amounting
to a direct risk of being persecuted – would nonetheless force the applicant back to
his country of origin, thereby indirectly exposing the individual to the risk of being
persecuted. Concern to avoid indirect refoulement underlies the text of Article 33(1)
of the 1951 Convention, which provides: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened.’147 The phrase ‘in any manner whatsoever’ is
strongly indicative of the need for a broad rather than a narrow assessment of the
applicant’s predicament, focused on the particular concerns and circumstances of
the individual applicant.148
Thus, if the conditions in the proposed IPA are such that this particular applicant
may be compelled in fact to return to the area in which the risk of being persecuted
exists rather than remain in the IPA, returning him or her to the IPA constitutes
indirect refoulement.149 By directing IPA analysis to those factors that may drive this
particular person back to the risk of persecution, asylum seekers gain the beneﬁt of
a focus on their speciﬁc physical, psychological, and social circumstances. In short,
the inquiry is whether this applicant – given who he or she is, what he or she believes,
and his or her essential make-up – would in fact be exposed to the risk of return to
the place of origin if required to accept an IPA in lieu of his presumptive entitlement
to asylum abroad.150
Critically, the assessment called for is not whether the decision maker believes
that the conditions in the IPA are, in the decision maker’s mind, sufﬁcient to drive
a ‘reasonable’ person back to the place of origin. Under ‘reasonableness’ analysis,
an adjudicator might question why a person would ever return to a home region if
she truly has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in that region and may thus be
tempted to ﬁnd the ‘reasonableness’ test satisﬁed even where there is a real chance
that indirect refoulement will occur. By contrast, the IPA approach is premised on the
notion that the decision maker’s sole focus should be on whether this person is
likely to be forced back to the dangerous region, regardless of what is ‘reasonable’ in
147 1951 Convention, Art. 33(1) (emphasis added).
148 See e.g. J. C. Hathaway and J. A. Dent, Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative Survey (York Lanes
Press, Toronto, 1995), p. 6.
149 The invocation of the duty of non-refoulement in relation to the risk of being forced to move internally parallels the approach of the ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, UN doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 Feb. 1998 (hereinafter ‘IDP Guiding Principles’), at Principle 15(d):
‘Internally displaced persons have . . . [t]he right to be protected against forcible return to or
resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.’
150 ‘Those characteristics do not matter because “of the opinion and feelings of the person concerned”, but because of the risk they may cause’: de Moffarts, above n. 30.
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the circumstances. This approach therefore constrains the scope of decision makers
to import their own subjective notions and assumptions of rational and appropriate behaviour into the determination process. This indirect refoulement analysis has
been impliedly embraced, for example, by a German Administrative Court, which
recognized that ‘[o]ne can, of course, see how it might logically be that strongly religious communities would feel compelled to risk persecution in order to return to
a region of the country of origin in which they could practice their faith’.151
It is clearly the case that the shift away from ‘reasonableness’ analysis in favour
of consideration of both indirect nexus and indirect refoulement proposed here will,
in many and perhaps most circumstances, yield a result which parallels that obtained under the ‘reasonableness’ approach. Indeed, the IPA approach has been
criticized on the basis that it constitutes a reasonableness assessment ‘by a different name’.152 For example, both methods of analysis acknowledge that an absence
of well-founded fear of being persecuted in the IPA is insufﬁcient to constitute
meaningful protection. Even at the level of speciﬁc considerations, the range of factors that may be relevant to IPA indirect nexus or indirect refoulement analysis is
large and includes some of the same factors as courts have taken into account in
assessing ‘reasonableness’.153 However at this point the similarity ends. Whereas
reasonableness involves, as has been shown above, the decision maker’s view of
reasonable behaviour,154 the IPA approach concentrates on the reality of the conditions for the applicant – the so-called ‘thin skull’ rule familiar to tort lawyers.
It appears that critics of the IPA approach have failed to grasp this fundamental
distinction.155 Moreover, ‘reasonableness’ assessment is not a dependable basis for
the protection of asylum seekers,156 since it is not anchored in a conceptual connection to the refugee deﬁnition. By contrast, a focus on either indirect nexus or the
risk of indirect refoulement provides a structured, principled, and focused inquiry
151 Baden-Württemberg Administrative Court, Decision of 17 May 1990, A 12 S 533/89.
152 Massey, above n. 32, p. 9. While criticizing the rejection of a ‘reasonableness’ criterion, Massey
nonetheless accepts the conceptual logic of the indirect refoulement approach.
153 The similarities in factors that may be considered in a reasonableness inquiry as compared
with the ‘indirect refoulement’ inquiry were recognized in New Zealand RSAA, Decision
No. 71729/99, 22 June 2000, [2001] NZAR 183. However, that decision emphasized that there
is no super-added reasonableness test, and that the signiﬁcance of ‘reasonableness’ follows
from its relevance to the issue of the availability of sufﬁcient internal protection (ibid., at
paras. 75–6).
154 See the text above at nn. 95–7.
155 For example, Massey attempts to apply this step of the Michigan approach by constructing a
series of scenarios in which the risk in the IPA does not amount to persecution, but is nonetheless serious. He then asks whether the asylum seeker would have ‘a greater chance of survival’
in the original site than the proposed site in each of the scenarios, Massey, above n. 32, pp. 7–9.
The Michigan approach, however, speciﬁcally eschews the notion of such a clinical objective
weighing of relative risks, favouring instead an acknowledgment that the focus is on what this
applicant is likely to do, whether or not it is adjudged ‘rational’ in the circumstances.
156 Interestingly, Massey appears to accept this criticism of the UNHCR approach. ‘The [1999
UNHCR] Position Paper does not give any explanation how these considerations [the applicant’s personal proﬁle] in particular, or the “reasonableness” test in general, enter into the assessment of well-founded fear’: Massey, above n. 32, pp. 17–18.
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and is not at risk of being dismissed by courts as a ‘humanitarian gloss’ on the Convention text. Rather, it is required as a matter of international law.

D.

Step 4: minimum afﬁrmative State protection available

The fourth and most conceptually challenging element in the protection
approach to devising a Convention-based IPA test gives content to the concept of
‘protection’. If, as we believe, the only textually sound basis to require an at-risk
person to accept an internal alternative to refugee status is that he or she can ‘avail
himself [or herself] of the protection of that country’, then it is incumbent upon
proponents of the IPA view to suggest just how the relevant ‘protection’ should be
conceived.
The point of departure – acknowledged in the case law and by UNHCR – is that
‘protection’ is not simply the absence of the risk of being persecuted. That is, a person may not be at risk of persecution, yet simultaneously not be protected. The
notion of ‘protection’ clearly implies the existence of some afﬁrmative defence or
safeguard. Yet once one moves beyond this truism, there is very little conceptual
clarity as to the method by which the essential content of protection might be deﬁned. One context-speciﬁc touchstone, however, is provided by the Preamble to the
1951 Convention in which it is noted that the key aim of the treaty is to ‘revise and
consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees
and to extend the scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new
agreement’ (emphasis added).157 At the very least, then, ‘protection’ as conceived by
the 1951 Convention includes legal rights of the kind stipulated in the Convention
itself.
Some decisions rendered under the traditional ‘reasonableness’ framework have
acknowledged the importance of legal rights to the assessment of internal protection alternatives. For example, cases involving child applicants have stressed the
importance of access to education and basic economic subsistence.158 Moreover, in
its Chahal decision, the European Court of Human Rights recognized the centrality
157 ‘The Convention and the Protocol represent a point of departure in considering the appropriate standard of treatment for refugees, often exceeded, but still at base proclaiming the fundamental principles of protection, without which no refugee can hope to attain a satisfactory and
lasting solution to his or her plight’: Goodwin-Gill, above n. 68, p. 296.
158 See e.g., Judgment of 24 March 1997, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1024/95,
NVwZ 97, 65. In Elmi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal Court
(Trial Division), Decision No. Imm-580-98 (1999), 1999 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 220), the tribunal
had rejected the asylum claim of a 16-year-old Somali who had been 10 years old when he ﬂed
Somalia, on the ground that he could relocate within Somalia. The court overturned the decision out of concern for his ability to access education or employment:
What is merely inconvenient for an adult might constitute ‘undue hardship’ for a
child . . . In a case of a child whose education already has been disrupted by war, and
who would arrive in Bossaso (IFA) without any money, the question arising is not
simply of ‘suitable employment’, but of any livelihood at all.
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of these concerns to the IPA inquiry. In that case, the Court denied that the Sikh
militant claimant had an IPA in India, in part because the Indian police and security forces would not be able to protect his civil and political rights there.159 Perhaps
most directly, Lord Woolf included reference to human rights standards in his formulation of the IPA test in the leading UK decision of R. v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department and another, ex parte Robinson:
In determining whether it would not be reasonable to expect the claimant to
relocate internally, a decision-maker will have to consider all the
circumstances of the case, against the backcloth that the issue is whether the
claimant is entitled to the status of refugee. Various tests have been
suggested. For example, . . . (d) if the quality of the internal protection fails to
meet basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights. So far
as the last of these considerations is concerned, the preamble to the
Convention shows that the contracting parties were concerned to uphold the
principle that human beings should enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination.160

Yet this fundamental rights approach has received too little judicial attention.
It may be that decision makers fear that ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’ is an
unmanageably vague notion. Moreover, it may be thought that a rights-based approach travels considerably beyond the requirements of the 1951 Convention text.
This point was implicitly made in an English decision dealing with the claim of a
Sri Lankan Tamil who argued that it would be unreasonable for him to be returned
to Sri Lanka. The Court afﬁrmed the rejection of his application by the Tribunal
below, stating:
It would not seem to me necessary, in considering [the reasonableness test, . . .
for decision makers] . . . to conduct a wide-ranging inquiry into the quality of
life which a returning applicant for asylum might expect to enjoy in the part
of his home country to which it was proposed to return him.161

The challenge, then, is to devise a principled approach which adumbrates the
rights-based understanding of ‘protection’ compelled by the internal structure of
the 1951 Convention, but which cannot be dismissed as simply a humanitarian option to be adopted by more generous States.
The minimum acceptable level of legal rights inherent in the notion of
‘protection’ is certainly open to debate. It might be argued that ‘protection’
requires a government normally to be able to deliver all of the basic international
human rights in the region of proposed protection. On this basis reference would
be made, at a minimum, to the obligations contained in the International Covenant
159 See above n. 132.
160 See above n. 142, pp. 939–40.
161 R. v. IAT, ex parte Sivanentheran, English Court of Appeal, [1997] Imm AR 504 at 509.

Internal protection/relocation/ﬂight alternative

407

on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. More realistically, Hugo Storey posits that ‘protection’
ought not to be deﬁned on the basis of absolute standards, but rather exists where
there is no discrimination in the enjoyment of all basic human rights between
persons returned on IPA grounds and others already resident in that place.162 A
third alternative is suggested by the UN’s 1998 ‘Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement’,163 which combine the absolute and relative approaches. Guiding
Principle 1 states:
Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and
freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their
country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any
rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced.164

Principles 10–30 revert to a more absolute approach, requiring respect for a series of more detailed rights framed with speciﬁc reference to the dilemmas that confront persons who are – as are those excluded on IPA grounds – forced to relocate
within their own country. There is therefore a logical appeal to deﬁning the minimum standard of afﬁrmative protection in the proposed IPA by reference to comparable norms.
Others, however, will argue that this approach risks going considerably beyond
what the 1951 Convention requires.165 Speciﬁcally, if the failure to ensure any of
these basic rights were to be deemed a sufﬁcient basis to ﬁnd an asylum applicant to be ‘unprotected’ in the proposed IPA site, an unwieldy disjuncture in the
conceptualization of the refugee deﬁnition could arise. This is because there is no
consensus that any risk to even a core, internationally protected human right is
162 Storey, above n. 29, pp. 5–11.
163 IDP Guiding Principles, above n. 149.
164 Ibid., Guiding Principle 1(1).
165 Professor R. Piotrowicz of the Department of Law, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, has made
this argument quite clearly:
The main point of the Convention is to ensure that those who have nowhere else to go
should not be sent to a territory where they are persecuted. If . . . the State seeking to
rely on the IPA/IFA/IRA cannot expect the asylum seeker to use the IPA/IFA/IRA in the
absence of conditions that meet ‘applicable human rights standards’, even though the
population at large in the relevant territory may not beneﬁt from the rights referred to
by these same ‘applicable international human rights standards’ . . . we would have a
situation where a superior human rights regime is demanded for asylum seekers but is
not available to the rest of the population in the IPA/IRA/IFA. Furthermore, it may be
that, even if the level of human rights protection is not as good as it might be,
nevertheless people in those areas are not being persecuted or having their rights
breached for reasons envisaged in the Refugee Convention. If that is the case, why
should it be relevant to the State seeking to rely on the IPA/IRA/IFA?
R. Piotrowicz, ‘Comment on the Draft Summary Conclusions’, 1 Oct. 2001 (on ﬁle with the
authors).
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tantamount to a risk of ‘being persecuted’. While ﬁrst level human rights – the
non-derogable civil and political rights (for example, freedom from torture) – are
nearly universally so recognized, a more nuanced analysis of the relevance of second level (derogable civil and political) and third level (economic, social, and cultural) rights is required. Some, but not all, threats to these rights amount to a risk of
‘being persecuted’.166 There will therefore clearly be situations in which protection
would be granted on the basis of a risk inconsistent with the ‘Guiding Principles’ –
for example, lack of access to sanitation facilities, inability to receive a passport,
absence of assistance in tracing relatives, or even conﬁscation of property – even
though the risk of such harms would not normally entitle a person originating in
the proposed IPA site to secure recognition of refugee status.
Because of this concern, the drafters of the IPA approach laid out in the ‘Michigan
Guidelines’ determined that reference could instead be made to the rights which
comprise the 1951 Convention’s own deﬁnition of ‘protection’. Since the rationale
for IPA analysis is to determine whether an internal site may be regarded as affording a sufﬁcient answer to the applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted such
that the presumptive remedy of protection in an asylum State is not required, then
there is a logic to measuring the sufﬁciency of IPA ‘protection’ in relation to the
actual protective duties of asylum States.167 The required standard is not respect
for all human rights, but rather provision of the rights codiﬁed as the 1951 Convention’s endogenous deﬁnition of ‘protection’ in Articles 2–33. In general terms,
these standards impose a duty of non-discrimination vis-à -vis citizens or other residents of the asylum country and refugees in relation to a core subset of civil and
socio-economic rights,168 including, for example, freedom of religion,169 freedom

166 Hathaway, Refugee Status, above n. 4, pp. 105–24.
167 A comparable approach was taken in Lay Kon Tji v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,
above n. 54, in which the Federal Court of Australia considered whether Portugal could provide
‘effective nationality’ to an applicant from East Timor. The Court held:
[B]y the Refugee Convention those countries that do grant refugee status to an
individual are also required to accord to the refugee freedom of religion (Article 4), to
allow the refugee freedom of association (Article 15), and to permit the refugee to have
free access to local courts (Article 16). If the country of second nationality would not
confer those rights on the putative refugee, being rights which by international law
must be afforded to a national, it could hardly be supposed that it was intended that the
putative refugee must seek the protection of that state. The reason a putative refugee
need not seek the protection of that state is because the nationality that the state offers
cannot be regarded as a truly effective nationality.
(Ibid., pp. 691–2).
168 See generally, J. C. Hathaway, ‘The International Refugee Rights Regime’, 8(2) Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law, 2000, pp. 91–139 (hereinafter, Hathaway, ‘Rights
Regime’).
169 1951 Convention, Art. 4.
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of movement,170 access to courts,171 and rights to work,172 social assistance,173 and
primary education.174
Reference to the 1951 Convention’s internal standard of ‘protection’ has been
criticized on the basis that there are difﬁculties with a literal application of Articles
2–33 to the internal protection analysis.175 This is certainly true to some extent, as
the 1951 Convention’s rights regime is tailored to counteract the disadvantages of
involuntary alienage.176 It is important to understand, however, that the IPA approach embraced by the ‘Michigan Guidelines’ does not suggest a literal application of Articles 2–33 in considering internal protection, but rather that decision
makers seek inspiration from the kind of interests protected by these Articles as a
way of deﬁning an endogenous notion of afﬁrmative protection in the refugee context. While in some ways falling somewhat short of the standard of ‘protection’ that
would follow from assessment by reference to all key human rights or even to the
‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, the non-discrimination approach
embodied in the 1951 Convention nonetheless provides a legally solid and contextualized assurance of durable protection. For example, the Canadian decision of
Soosaipillai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) – in which the Federal
Court held that it would be ‘unduly harsh’ to require an elderly Tamil couple to seek
protection in Colombo because ethnic discrimination would lead to difﬁculties in
gaining access to the government services, which the frail applicants required177 –
could just as readily (and more legally justiﬁably) have been adjudicated in the
claimants’ favour on the basis of a protection-based understanding of IPA.
As this example makes clear, our point is not that the ‘reasonableness’ approach
cannot generate positive protection results for asylum seekers whose cases are subject to internal protection analysis. To the contrary, in the hands of experienced and
thoughtful decision makers, we believe the results will be largely the same. The difference, however, is that the greater analytical structure of IPA analysis and its more
solid footing in international refugee law allow it more dependably to generate rightsregarding determinations of the reality of internal protection. By focusing on the
provision of fundamental civil and socio-economic rights on a non-discriminatory
basis – whether by reference to the whole spectrum of international human rights
law, the ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, or to the rights in the 1951
Convention itself – an understanding of ‘protection’ that is readily amenable to
appellate and other accountability is established.
The ﬁnal point to emphasize is that minimum afﬁrmative State protection implies that there is a State in fact in control in the proposed IPA. This is not a notion
170
173
176
177

Ibid., Art. 26.
171 Ibid., Art. 16.
172 Ibid., Arts. 17, 18, 19, and 24.
Ibid., Arts. 20, 21, and 23.
174 Ibid., Art. 22.
175 Massey, above n. 32, pp. 10–12.
Hathaway, ‘Rights Regime’, above n. 168.
Canadian Federal Court Trial Division, Decision No. IMM-4846-98 (1999); 1999 Fed. Ct. Trial
Lexis 834.
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free from controversy or from divergence in State practice.178 It is an extremely
important issue, however, since lack of adherence to this principle has resulted in
questionable applications of the internal protection principle. For example, some
governments reject Iraqi Kurdish asylum seekers on the ground that they can relocate to one of the two Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq.179 Similarly, some courts
have held that Somali applicants can be returned to Somaliland or Puntland, even
though no State structure is in place there.180 In cases involving Somali claimants in
particular, such ﬁndings have frequently required applicants to turn to their own
clan for protection.181 In one particularly worrying decision, the Spanish Supreme
Court explicitly required the applicant to commit himself to joining one ethnic faction in order to obtain protection in holding that: ‘Liberia is divided into territorial
zones which are under the inﬂuence of different governments or authorities of the
tribes or ethnic rivals, so that its citizens can avail themselves of the protection of
the government they feel allied (related) to.’182
The fundamental problem with such decisions is that none of the proposed protectors – whether it is ethnic leaders in Liberia, clans in Somalia, or embryonic local
authorities in portions of northern Iraq – is positioned to deliver what Article 1A(2)
178 See e.g., de Moffarts, above n. 30:
The Geneva Convention does not specify what authority should give ‘the protection
of his country’. To be meaningful, protection does not necessarily have to be given by
the central authority. It may also be [delegated to] a ‘de facto’ authority established
on a part of the national territory [for] citizens having an effective link with this
authority.

179

180

181

182

This approach does not, however, address the question of the international legal accountability
of such a ‘de facto authority’, the critical concern from a protection perspective.
In Tawﬁk v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ 835, the Canadian Federal Court denied refugee status to a Turkish Kurd on the grounds that ‘with some portion of
northern Iraq under the de facto control of an elected Turkish government’, an IPA existed.
German courts have been somewhat in conﬂict on whether this approach is appropriate. While
the Higher Administrative Court of Schleswig-Holstein (judgments of 18 Feb. 1998, 2 L 166/96
and 2 L 41/96) argued that northern Iraq cannot offer internal protection because there are no
State-like structures there, the Federal Administrative Court (BverwG 9 C 17.98, 8 Dec. 1998)
has disagreed, holding that the key question is whether a person would be targeted by Iraqi
agents: ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, p. 35.
See e.g., the decision of the Canadian Federal Court (Trial Division) in Saidi v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ 932, in which refugee status was denied to a Somali
applicant on the grounds that ‘his clan afﬁliation and its acceptance by the majority in the north
of the country’ established an IPA. This is also the practice in Denmark: ELENA Research Paper,
above n. 3, p. 33.
See e.g., the decisions of the Netherlands Rechtseenheidskamer (Law Unity Chamber), AWB
99/104, 3 June 1999; and AWB 99/73, 3 June 1999 (holding that the Mudug province in Somalia
could be considered safe for members of the Darod and Hawiye clans which control much of the
territory).
Decision of 19 June 1998: see ELENA Research Paper, above n. 3, p. 49. See also Zalzali v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 FC 605, in which the Canadian Federal Court
suggested, in the context of Lebanon, that there was a duty to seek the protection not only of
one’s national State, but also of ‘an established authority’ acting as a government.
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of the 1951 Convention requires, namely, the protection of a State accountable under international law. The protective obligations of the 1951 Convention in Articles
2–33 are speciﬁcally addressed to ‘States’. The very structure of the 1951 Convention requires that protection will be provided not by some legally unaccountable
entity with de facto control, but rather by a government capable of assuming and
being held responsible under international law for its actions. In practical terms,
the rights enumerated in the 1951 Convention similarly envisage that protection
will be provided by an entity that has established, inter alia, a formal system for regulating aliens’ social and economic rights,183 a legal and judicial system,184 and a
mechanism for issuing identity and travel documents.185 Indeed, the fundamental
premise that refugee protection is an inter-State system intended to deliver surrogate or substitute protection assumes the right of at-risk persons to access a legally
accountable State – not just some (hopefully) sympathetic or friendly group – if
and when the individual’s own State fails fundamentally to protect his or her basic
rights. There is simply no basis in law or principle to deviate from this foundational
principle in the internal protection context.

VI.

Procedural safeguards

While procedural questions have been alluded to in the context of the substantive analysis presented above, we wish here to reiterate and draw together at
least the most important issues of process in the internal protection context.
First, because IPA is deﬁned in part by whether or not it can truly deliver an
‘antidote’ to the applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted,186 it follows
necessarily that an IPA test should never be used in an accelerated procedure to
deny refugee status before inquiring fully into the particular circumstances of an
applicant.187 As explained above, the unfortunate practice of considering ‘internal
ﬂight’ as providing grounds for summary dismissal of a refugee claim is arguably
logical if such considerations are (inaccurately) viewed as part of the basic ‘wellfounded fear’ inquiry.188 Under the protection approach, however, there can be no
183 1951 Convention, Arts. 6, 17–19, and 21.
184 Ibid., Arts. 12 and 16.
185 Ibid., Arts. 25, 27, and 28.
186 See the text above at nn. 120 et seq.
187 E.g. in Perampalam v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, above n. 114, the Full Court
of the Federal Court of Australia held that the lower tribunal had committed an error of law in
its application of the ‘relocation principle’, on the basis inter alia of its ‘sparse ﬁndings’ which
did not:
engage in anything like an examination of the evidence to determine whether it would
be reasonable to assume that the . . . extortion demands [of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam] would cease if the appellant moved a mere quarter of a mile away from her
home to her daughter’s home.
Ibid., p. 283 per Burchett and Lee JJ.
188 See the text above at nn. 41–8.
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question of internal protection being considered before the decision maker establishes the nature and scope of the well-founded fear of being persecuted in the region from which an applicant has ﬂed. As held by the New Zealand Refugee Status
Appeals Authority:
Applications raising the issue of ‘internal [protection] alternative’ raise a
number of complex questions, and no international consensus exists as to its
precise relevance for the determination of refugee status. In most instances, it
will require an in-depth examination to establish whether the persecution
faced by the applicant is clearly limited to a speciﬁc area and that effective
protection is available in other parts of the country. For this reason, it is not
appropriate to consider such applications in the same manner as manifestly
unfounded applications.189

Secondly, it is extremely important that IPA be assessed in each individual
case.190 Thus, decision makers should never apply generalized ﬁndings regarding
‘safety’ for whole ethnic or other groups in an IPA without considering the feasibility of the IPA for the particular individual whose application is being considered. It
is vital that decision makers assess the prospects for each individual applicant in obtaining protection in the proposed IPA, based on an assessment of the risk factors in
each particular case, rather than on broad and general conclusions of the situation
of all members of a particular group in the proposed IPA.191
An excellent example of the overriding importance of this principle is provided
by the decision of the Canadian Federal Court in Bhambri v. Canada.192 That case concerned an application for asylum by a Sikh man, suspected by police of supporting
Sikh militants, who had been arrested, beaten and tortured by the Indian police on
three occasions over the course of thirteen months, for periods of seven days, twelve
days, and three weeks respectively. Bhambri had escaped each time by bribing the
police. Following his father’s arrest on two occasions, designed to elicit information
as to Bhambri’s whereabouts, Bhambri ﬂed to an unnamed region of India where
he lived with an aunt, a medical doctor. The aunt was subsequently arrested for
189 New Zealand RSAA, Decision No. 70951/98, above n. 47. According to the ELENA Research
Paper, above n. 3, a number of European countries, including Spain and Austria, have clearly
eliminated IPA from a manifestly unfounded or accelerated procedures: see ibid., pp. 17
and 49.
190 According to de Moffarts, above n. 30: ‘Each case should be decided on its particular circumstances, not according to some blanket approach to different categories or nationalities of
claimants.’
191 This is speciﬁcally required in some jurisdictions. For example, a Netherlands court ruled that
the north of Iraq cannot be an IPA for every rejected asylum seeker from Iraq; rather Netherlands ofﬁcials must examine each individual case in order to determine whether the applicant
has sufﬁcient ties with northern Iraq: Rechtseenheidskamer, 13 Sept. 1999, AWB 99/3380.
192 Bhambri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal Court (Trial
Division), Decision No. IMM-649-96, [1996] FCJ 1661, 18 Dec. 1996.
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having treated a Sikh militant for a bullet wound, and Bhambri then ﬂed India.
The Federal Court nonetheless approved the Convention Refugee Determination
Division’s clearly insufﬁciently particularized ﬁnding:
Since the applicant was released from detention every time he was arrested,
upon payment of a bribe, the Punjab police did not consider the applicant to
be a terrorist or a supporter of terrorists . . . Sikhs can usually resettle
elsewhere in India. This would most certainly be possible in the case of this
applicant because he was not a member of any political organization, nor did
he engage in anti-government activities.193

This result is highly questionable given the speciﬁc circumstances of this applicant’s predicament. Even if it were true that ‘Sikhs can usually resettle in India’, it
is dangerous to rely on such generalizations in lieu of assessment of the reality of
an individual’s case.194
Thirdly, the adoption of the protection approach necessarily implies, as described above,195 that the authorities of the asylum State have the evidentiary
193 Ibid.
194 This is often a problem in cases involving Sikhs from the Punjab and Tamils from the north
of Sri Lanka. Although the Canadian Federal Court (Trial Division) has emphasized that the inquiry must be individualized and that there can be no generic determination of reasonableness
(see Pathmakanthan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ 1158), in practice both the Immigration and Refugee Board and the Court continue to apply general conclusions in individual cases. This can be seen in the approach to an application for asylum by a Punjabi farmer who had been forced to provide food, shelter, and transportation to Sikh militants.
Following this activity he was arrested and detained by the Indian police, and was interrogated
and ‘badly tortured’ by them. He managed to bribe his way out of prison and required six weeks
of medical attention. He twice attempted to live with relatives in other provinces, initially in
Uttar Pradesh and then in Delhi. However, police inquiries and his family’s concern regarding
the police suspicion drove him back to Punjab, where he was again detained and tortured by
the police. The Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) rejected his asylum claim
on IFA grounds and this rejection was afﬁrmed on appeal to the Federal Court, where Gibson J
explained:
On the facts before it, and, in particular, by reference to documentary evidence, the
CRDD in this matter found there to be IFA destinations in India for Sikhs from the
Punjab. The CRDD then turned to the second portion of the test, consideration of
whether the IFA destinations, or any of them, would be reasonable for this Applicant on
the circumstances of his individual claim . . . I conclude that the CRDD applied the
appropriate test in law in reaching the conclusion it did regarding an IFA for this
particular applicant.
Dhaliwal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Federal Court of Canada (Trial
Division), Decision No. IMM-1200-97 (1997); 1997 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 1408. Although acknowledging a role for an assessment of ‘reasonableness’ in the particular case, the CRDD’s
decision (as approved by the Federal Court) gave short shrift to the particular circumstances of
this case, preferring simply to adhere to its general view that Sikhs have an IPA in India. See
also, Matter of R., above n. 33; and Australian RRT, Decision No. V96/04189, 26 Feb. 1997.
195 See the text above at n. 41.
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burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that an IPA exists.196 This follows
logically from the fact that before turning to a consideration of the possibility of an
IPA, a decision maker is already satisﬁed that the applicant has established that he
or she faces a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason, thus
giving rise to a presumptive entitlement to refugee status. When one considers that
the responsibility for fact-ﬁnding is shared throughout the entire refugee status
determination,197 it is vital that applications not be rejected based on an incorrect
assumption that the applicant bears the onus of disproving every theoretical IPA
site. The protection approach views an IPA inquiry as being akin to an exclusion inquiry, with the accompanying high degree of caution involved in ﬁnding that a sufﬁcient degree of protection is available to obviate the need for protection under the
Convention regime. The evidentiary responsibility on the asylum State to establish
that an IPA exists extends to each of the four essential elements of the test of sufﬁciency of the IPA, namely, accessibility, antidote, no new risk of being persecuted
or of indirect refoulement, and presence of afﬁrmative protection. Once a prima facie
case is presented, the asylum seeker may similarly rely upon any of these factors to
rebut the assertion that an IPA exists.198
Finally and most fundamentally, procedural fairness must be accorded refugee
applicants in the assessment of an IPA, as in relation to all aspects of refugee status
determination. In the IPA context, this means that, at a minimum, the applicant
must be given clear and adequate notice that the adjudicating authority intends to
canvass the possibility of denying status on internal protection grounds. This includes notice as to the speciﬁc location which is proffered as an IPA, with adequate
196 C. Harvey, Seeking Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects (Butterworths, London, 2000),
pp. 280–1. There is, however, no universal agreement on this point. For example, the New
Zealand RSAA has recently afﬁrmed that the onus is on the refugee applicant to establish that
no IPA is available, although this ﬁnding turned on the speciﬁc legislative provisions in New
Zealand: Decision No. 71729/99, New Zealand RSAA, 22 June 2000, above n. 153, at para. 90.
Even in these circumstances, the RSAA has made it clear that, once a prima facie case is established, the asylum State must give notice that an IPA is to be considered (unless this is obvious
from the context of the case); Also, ‘the decision-maker has a legal obligation to disclose to the
claimant any evidence relating to the internal protection alternative which the decision-maker
intends to rely upon’ (ibid., at para. 92). It has been suggested, however, that there is no necessary inconsistency between the notion that the asylum seeker is charged with the overall onus
to prove his or her case, even as the authorities of the asylum State – once a prima facie case for
refugee status is made out – then assume the evidentiary burden to show an internal protection alternative. At this point, ‘it may be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that the [risk of] persecution will continue’: Justice D. Baragwanath, ‘A Comment on Professor
Hathaway’s and Ms Foster’s Paper’, Sept. 2001, p. 7 (on ﬁle with authors).
197 ‘[W]hile the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner’: UNHCR, Handbook,
above n. 11, at para. 196.
198 This is important to emphasize, as one analyst has incorrectly concluded that the afﬁrmative
protection approach creates a set of additional hurdles to be overcome by the applicant: Massey,
above n. 32, p. 12, n. 38.
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opportunity to prepare a case in rebuttal.199 As the Canadian Federal Court has
explained:
[I]n some cases the claimant may not have any personal knowledge of other
areas of the country, but, in all likelihood, there is documentary evidence
available and, in addition, the Minister will normally offer some evidence
supporting the [IPA] if the issue is raised at the hearing.
On the other hand, there is an onus on the Minister and the Board to warn
the claimant if an [IPA] is going to be raised. A refugee claimant enjoys the
beneﬁt of the principles of natural justice . . . A basic and well-established
component of the right to be heard includes notice of the case to be met . . .
The purpose of this notice is, in turn, to allow a person to prepare an
adequate response to that case. This right to notice of the case against the
claimant is acutely important where the claimant may be called upon to
provide evidence to show that no valid [IPA] exists in response to an allegation
by the Minister. Therefore, neither the Minister nor the [adjudicating
tribunal] may spring the allegation of an [IPA] upon a complainant without
notice that an [IPA] will be in issue at the hearing.200

VII.

Conclusion

Our analysis proposes the rejection of two extreme positions. On the one
hand, it makes little sense to recognize the refugee status of an individual who truly
can access meaningful domestic protection in a part of his or her country of origin, thereby avoiding the risk of being persecuted. In view of the fundamental surrogate protection purpose of international refugee law, there is no duty to admit
as refugees those whose own government can be counted on to protect their basic
rights in part, but not all, of the national territory. As refugees now frequently ﬂee
largely regionalized threats rather than monolithic aggressor States, the continuing viability of refugee law demands that account be taken of genuine opportunities for internal protection.
On the other hand, the speciﬁc approach taken in some States to assessment of internal protection possibilities often leaves much to be desired. Fundamentally, it is
contrary to the ordinary meaning of words to insist that the existence of an internal
199 Some courts have speciﬁcally imposed this requirement. For example, the Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal held that a claimant from Afghanistan could not be denied refugee status on
IPA grounds unless the tribunal could point to a speciﬁc alternative region of Afghanistan as
constituting an IPA: Rabbani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Canadian Federal
Court (Trial Division), Decision No. IMM-236-96 (1997), 1997 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 681. See also
Austrian Administrative Court, Decision No. 95/20/0295, 1996, in which the Court rejected an
IPA for a Kurd from Turkey because the Minister failed to specify an exact IPA location.
200 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada, above n. 25, pp. 595–6.
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protection option means that an asylum seeker does not have a ‘well-founded fear of
being persecuted’. Nobody would suggest, for example, that an individual at risk
in Zurich, but who can ﬁnd safety in Geneva, is not at risk in Switzerland. He or
she is at risk in Switzerland, but can also ﬁnd a remedy there. This common sense
conceptualization of the issue can easily be accommodated by the structure of the
1951 Convention. Even a person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted
in the country of origin must also demonstrate that he or she ‘is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country’.
If the applicant’s own government is genuinely able and willing to protect him or
her in a new location, this requirement is not satisﬁed, and refugee status may be
denied. But because internal protection is considered only after the applicant has
established a prima facie case of risk in his or her place of origin, internal protection
is effectively treated as an issue of exclusion from refugee status in relation to which
the government bears the evidentiary burden.
This is not a semantic or purely academic debate. As we have shown, the assessment of internal protection as part of the initial ‘well-founded fear’ analysis has
frequently led to unwarranted denials of refugee status. In particular, treating internal protection as relevant to the initial case to be made by the asylum seeker has
logically led some courts to impose a duty on the applicant to prove that no city,
town, or village is safe for him or her, an approach rightly condemned by UNHCR
as imposing an impossible evidentiary burden. Of even greater concern, locating
internal protection analysis in the basic well-founded fear inquiry has provided
a basis for the pre-emption of an analysis of risk in the place of origin altogether
where internal protection appears to be plausible. Yet without a clear sense of the
underlying risk, how can the sufﬁciency of countervailing internal protection truly
be assessed? UNHCR’s recent gloss on the ‘well-founded fear’ approach – namely,
that there must be access to ‘safety’, and that it must be ‘reasonable’ to seek internal
protection – has not remedied the problem. To the contrary, this standard has been
relied upon by some decision makers to impose what amounts to a duty to hide (for
example, by suppressing religious or political beliefs) in the country of origin, an
approach patently at odds with the most basic goals of refugee law. The fungible
notion of ‘safety’ (not a term found in the 1951 Convention) has also proved a dangerous distraction, leading some States to return applicants to face the risk of war
and other serious dangers. While the harshness of this approach can be mitigated
by judicious application of the ‘reasonableness’ criterion, in practice the inherent
subjectivity of such an inquiry too often results in an ad hoc jurisprudence in which
similarly situated persons are not similarly treated. And because there is no basis in
the Refugee Convention to insist on the assessment of ‘reasonableness’, decision
makers have understandably begun to question whether reasonableness should really be a part of the refugee status inquiry at all.
Our analysis here has therefore drawn together what we consider to be the best
practice of courts around the world in a single, analytically clear approach, termed

Internal protection/relocation/ﬂight alternative

417

the ‘internal protection alternative’. Firmly based on the text of the 1951 Convention itself, this standard is explicitly designed to realize the most basic goal of the
Convention, namely, to identify as refugees only those persons who require the
surrogate protection of refugee law because they do not have access to the protection of their own State. By undertaking the four fundamental inquiries outlined
above – accessibility, antidote to the original well-founded fear, no new risk of being persecuted or of refoulement to the region of origin, and the presence of minimum afﬁrmative State protection – we can ensure that protection is only denied on
the basis of a clear understanding of both all risks, and all possibilities for meeting
the asylum seeker’s protection needs within the borders of his or her own country.
So conceived, internal protection analysis is an inherent part of refugee status determination, effectively enabling States to meet new protection challenges without
risk of denying protection to persons who have no choice but to turn to the international community.

